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1. INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognized that the expectations individuals hold 
concerning future events are important determinants of their behavior in 
the market place. One of the difficulties associated with the incor­
poration of expectations into economic models is the statement of how 
those expectations are actually formed. The difficulty is complicated 
by the fact that expectations are not directly observable. 
An elegant solution to the problem of describing the formation of 
expectations was proposed by Muth (1961). His theory of expectation 
formation flowed from a consideration of the fundamental economic 
problem, the description of human behavior in the presence of scarcity. 
Muth argued that information is a scarce resource and should not be 
wasted in an economy. Consequently, expectations should be formed in a 
manner that makes the most efficient use of scare information. The most 
efficient use of information should be obtained by basing the expectation 
upon the economic model describing the market of interest. Such expecta­
tions have become widely known as rational expectations. This hypothesis 
has great appeal to economists as it is derived from the premise that 
economic agents will make the optimal use of scarce resources. Its 
appeal is enhanced by the fact that it admits a straightforward strategy 
for the derivation of a functional expression describing the unobserva-
ble expectation. 
Any model of expectation formation must address two distinct 
issues. These are the determination of the quantity of information an 
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agent will use when forming an expectation, and how the agent will 
actually construct the expectation, given the chosen set of information. 
The typical interpretation of the theory of rational expectations 
(Revankar (1980), Wallis (1980)) is that agents use all the relevant 
information that is available and that they construct the forecast by 
forming the stochastic expectation of, say price, conditional upon that 
information. The structure of the conditional expectation is drawn from 
the economic model describing the market in which the price is generated. 
In this work, the proposition that agent's expectations take the 
form of stochastic conditional expectations is maintained. That is, 
agents are assumed to make efficient (in a statistical sense) use of a 
given set of information. The main purpose is to develop a model of 
expectation formation which incorporates costly information and to 
perform econometric tests of the model. Because information is considered 
a scarce resource, it follows that there are costs associated with its use. 
Optimizing economic agents should make use of information in the forma­
tion of expectations only up to the point of which the marginal benefits 
of additional information collection equals the marginal costs of that 
activity (Arrow (1978), Friedman (1979)). 
The analysis of the extent of information usage is divided into 
three major components. First, in Chapter 2, there is a theoretical 
examination of the value of information to economic agents. The 
analysis deals exclusively with agents trading in production markets. 
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This differs from most existing work dealing with the value of informa­
tion, which has examined the behavior of agents engaged in speculative 
activities. This distinction was felt to be important because most 
economic activity involves production and consumption decisions 
regarding goods for which futures markets do not exist. 
In Chapter 2, the influence of the parameters describing production 
function and the market in general on the value of information are dis­
cussed. The dependency of the value of information to one agent on the 
level of information usage by other agents in the market is demonstrated. 
It is shown that the attainment of the socially optimal level of informa­
tion usage within a market depends critically upon the type of information 
being used. The proposition that economic agents may not use all the 
information available, when that information is costly, is found to have 
theoretical support. 
The second component, presented in Chapter 3, deals with the 
estimation of econometric models involving rational expecations. It is 
not assumed that agents use all the information that is available. 
Methods of empirically testing the rational expectations hypothesis are 
presented. Standard econometric methods, with slight modifications, are 
found to be applicable to this problem. Estimation and hypothesis 
testing involves the selection of a set of variables that are a subset 
of those actually used by agents in forming expectations. A method for 
the selection of these variables is suggested. 
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Chapter 4 contains the last component, which is an empirical 
investigation of expectation formation by producers of broiler chickens, 
using the methods developed in Chapter 3. Much of the existing work 
that incorporate tests of the hypothesis of rationality (Sargent (1978), 
Lahiri (1980), Leiderman (1980), Hoffman and Schlagenhauf (1983)) has 
been set in a macro-economic framework. The results of the empirical 
tests of rationality have been mixed. It was hoped that analyzing 
expectation formation on an industry level would reduce the chance of 
model misspecification. One study which has examined the hypothesis 
of rationality on an industry level is that by Goodwin and Sheffrin 
(1983), in which the hypothesis could not be rejected. This author's 
analysis suggests that broiler producers do not form expectations 
rationally, in the sense of Muth, when making short run production 
decisions. It must be noted that this does not imply that broiler 
producers are behaving in a nonoptimal manner with respect to informa­
tion usage and expectation formation. The implication is that the 
optimal production strategy may not always entail the formation of 
rational expectations. 
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2, THE VALUE OF INFORMATION IN PRODUCTION MARKETS 
Some of the first efforts to model the way in which agents form 
expectations resulted from attempts to build econometric models of 
markets in which expectations played an important role. An early and 
frequently used expectations rule in agricultural markets gave rise to 
cobweb models (Ezekiel (1938)), in which a firms expected price is 
simply the observed market price at the time expectations are formed. 
A more sophisticated rule was developed by Fisher (1930) in his work 
on the expected rates of inflation. He assumed that agents' 
expectations of future rates of inflation were weighted sums 
(distributed lags) of the rates of inflation that had already been 
observed. Distributed lag models of expectation formation were 
further refined, culminating in Nerlove's adaptive expectations model 
in which agents' expectations are modified by the most recently 
observed forecast error. This assumption generated a distributed lag 
model in which the weights decline geometrically. All of these models 
stressed the usefulness of the past history of price when trying to 
forecast the price that will prevail in the future. 
A major development in the theory of expectation formation was 
made by Muth (1960) when he proposed the theory of rational expectations. 
Muth argued that, if there exists a joint probability distribution 
describing the relationship between the future, unknown price and the 
set of variables (information) observable at the time expectations are 
formed, then agents' expectations should be modeled as the stochastic 
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expectation of the future price conditional upon the available informa­
tion. Muth argued that information in a valuable resource, and that it 
will not be wasted by economic agents. 
Economic models generally specify the quantity supplied and the 
quantity demanded in a market to be functions of the price of the 
commodity, of a set of exogenous, observable variables, and of a seL 
of unobservable disturbances. Setting quantity supplied equal to 
quantity demanded gives an expression for the equilibirum price in 
terms of the exogenous variables and the disturbances. If the 
disturbances are serially uncorrelated, forecasting the future price 
is then a matter of forecasting its determinants, the exogenous 
variables in the model. Consequently, if agents know the past history 
of the exogenous variables, then under rational expectations the past 
history of market prices are not used at all in the formation of 
expectations. Contrast this with the distributed lag models in which 
market prices were all that mattered. 
Muth's model focused attention on the problem of how much informa­
tion agents will actually use when forming expectations. The use of 
information when forming expectations is the result of economic 
decision making, and will be based upon a comparison of the costs and 
benefits involved. Ifhen information is costly, it is certainly 
possible that agents will not use all that is available, as noted by 
Arrow (1978), and Friedman (1979). While Muth's suggestion that 
agents utilize information by forming conditional expectations is 
generally accepted, it is not clear exactly what information, and how 
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much, they will choose to use. These problems lead on'e'to think about 
the determinants of the value of information and whether market price 
may be reintroduced as an important component of agent's expectation 
rules. 
Lucas (1972) was one of the first to note that economic agents 
can use market prices to learn about the value of exogenous variables 
that they do not explicitly observe. The price that prevails in a 
market is dependent upon the values of the exogenous variables in the 
system, so that agents can use the current price to learn something 
about the current values of those variables. Such knowledge is useful 
in predicting future values of the exogenous variables, which in turn, 
is useful in predicting future prices. 
A number of authors have expanded on this theme. The papers by 
Kihlstrom and Mirman (1975), Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) (1980), 
Grossman (1977) (1981), Green (1977), Grandmont (1977), Danthine (1978), 
and Verrecchia (1982) all have a common basic structure. Agents live 
in a world with two time periods, the present and the future. They 
must make a decision in the present regarding resource allocation which 
will determine their consumption of goods in the future, and these 
decisions are carried out in a market. For example, the agents may be 
endowed with assets, some of which are safe and some of which are 
risky. They may exchange the two types of assets in a market, depending 
upon their beliefs about which will be more valuable in the future. 
Other examples involve inventory speculation and futures markets. The 
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realization of some future exogenous random variable affects the outcome 
of the decision they make, and the agents differ in the amount of infor­
mation they have concerning the probable value of that variable. It is 
convenient to call one group informed and the other group uninformed, 
where for example, the informed group observes a random variable that 
is correlated with the future exogenous variable, while the uninformed 
do not. The uninformed do observe the price in the market, as that is 
assumed to be freely available. The equilibrium price in the market 
summarizes, perhaps imperfectly, all the agents' different information 
about the future exogenous variable. This occurs because informed 
agents will bid in the market on the basis of their knowledge, which will 
cause the nrice in the market to fluctuate in a way that reveals their 
beliefs. For example, if some investors learn that the risky asset is 
likely to yield a high return in the future, they will bid its price up, 
which will send a signal to the uninformed agents of that fact. 
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the same problems of the 
value of information and of the informational content of market prices, 
but in a model of production rather than in a model of exchange. We 
consider the partial equilibrium in a market in which production and 
consumption are the only activities. There are no futures markets 
and no inventory speculation. This differs from the model of 
exchange in the following way. In the model of exchange, market prices 
are functions of agents' expectations of future events. It is natural 
that these prices will convey some knowledge of agents' beliefs about 
the future. In a model of production, market prices reflect agents' 
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expectations, that were formed in the past, of current prices. It will 
be shown that informed traders can still pass information about the 
future to the uninformed in such a market. In fact, a number of 
conclusions concerning information in exchange markets also hold true 
in production markets. 
2.1 The Value of Information to a Firm 
We begin by reviewing the general theory of the value of information 
to a firm. For an excellent survey of the development of information 
theory, the reader is directed to Hirshleifer and Riley (1979). 
Consider a firm operating in a purely competitive market. The 
utility of the firm is strictly a function of profit, U = U(n), where 
profit is determined by the level of output, Y, the market price P, 
and a cost function C(Y): 
7r(P,Y) = PY - C(Y) 
where C*(Y) > 0 and C''(Y)< 0 . 
It will frequently be the case that the firm's production process 
takes time and that the market price will change between the time a 
supply decision is made and the time the outcome of that decision is 
realized. The firm is then faced with uncertainty, at the time the 
supply decision is made, about the value of the market price they will 
actually receive. It will be assumed that supply decisions are 
exactly realized so that there is no uncertainty about the output 
level Y which results from a supply decision. Both Grossman (1975) and 
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Danthine (1978) note that stochastic production does not affect supply 
decisions if the stochastic component does not affect marginal products. 
This will be the case if, for example, realized production is equal to 
planned production plus an independent, zero mean random disturbance. 
It will also be assumed that the commodity being produced is nonstorable 
and that no futures markets exist, so that there is no potential for 
inventory speculation or for hedging. 
Assume that the behavior of the price P is described by a 
probability density function f(P). Because price is stochastic, profit 
and the resulting utility will also be stochastic. If the firm's utility 
function, U(tt), satisfies the assumptions of von Neumann-Mor gens tern 
utility theory, the firm will make supply decisions so as to maximize 
the expected utility of the profit which results from those decisions. 
Let Q denote the expected utility maximizing level of production, defined 
by: 
Q = Max E[U(TT(P,Y)] . 
Y 
Let X be a random variable such that P and X have a joint density 
function f(P,X), and such that a realization of X is observable at the 
time a supply decision is made by the firm. The variable X yields 
information about the distribution of the unobserved price through the 
conditional density f(p|x). In the following analysis, when a realization 
of X has been observed so that it is fixed and not random, it will be 
denoted by x. 
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Let Q(x) denote the utility maximizing level of production when x 
is observed, defined by: 
Q(x) = Max E[U(7r(P,Y) |x] . 
Y 
Because the value of x is used in forming the supply decision Q(x), it 
•may be thought of an input into the production process. Like any other 
input, there are costs and benefits associated with its use, and the 
decision by the firm to acquire it depends upon whether the benefits 
exceed the costs. 
Suppose that x may be observed for some fixed cost C. For example, 
there may be an information service, which the firm may subscribe to, 
which provides the current realization of X for a fee. The firm may or 
may not choose to purchase x. If x is not purchased, the firm follow 
the supply rule Q. If x is purchased the firm will follow the supply 
rule Q(x), and incur an additional fixed cost of C dollars. The firm 
should pursue the strategy that yields the greater expected utility. 
However, the decision to purchase x must be made before it is knovm what 
particular realization will occur. When the firm is only considering 
the purchase of x, the supply decision that will result is a random 
variable, Q(X), so that the stochastic behavior of the firm's profit 
ïï(P,Q(X)), is determined by the joint density f(P,X). Consequently, the 
value X should be purchased if that action results in an increase in 
expected utility, where the expectation is taken over both P and X, as in: 
E [U(TT(P,Q(X)) - C)] > E [U(TT(P,Q))1 . 
P,X p 
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Even though the acquisition of x reduces profit by the fixed amount C, 
the above expression may hold because knowledge of x permits the firm 
to make a supply decision that is "closer" to the supply decision that 
would be reached if the future price were known with certainty. 
In the following analysis, specific forms of the utility and cost 
functions are assumed. The specific functions chosen allow closed 
form solutions to be derived for variables and constants of interest. 
We begin by discussing the value of information to an individual firm. 
Let the firm be risk neutral so that maximizing expected utility 
is achieved by maximizing expected profit, and let the cost function 
take the form: 
AY^  C(Y) = ' A > 0 . 
Linear and constant terms are not included in this function to reduce 
notation. Their absence does not affect the final conclusions that 
will be reached. Using this cost function to evaluate the supply 
rules Q and Q(x) yields: 
q(x) .  ^  .
The importance of the specified cost function in obtaining these 
supply rules should be noted. The critical property of this function 
is that it generates a problem of static rather than dynamic optimization. 
This is because the level of production in one period does not effect the 
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cost of production in any other period. If this were not the case, the 
optimal production decision would be a function of past production 
decisions and of the expected profit in all future periods. 
Now, expected profit when x is not observed is 
E [TT(P,Q)] = . 
P 
Expected profit when x is observed (unconditional upon the particular 
value of x) is 
E(E(P|X)2) 
E [n(P,Q(X))- C] = C . 
P,X 
In order for the acquisition of x to increase expected profit, it must 
be the case that 
J, 
2A 
E(E(P|X)2) - (E(P))2 
X 
> C 
or 
Var(E(P|X)) 
2k ^ ' 
The left hand side of the above expression is the value of knowing 
X, to be denoted by v(x); 
'fe) = (1.1, 
and represents the maximum amount the firm would be willing to pay to 
know X. The value of information is determined by the joint density 
f(P,X) and by the parameter A of the cost function. 
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Note the value of information is directly related to the variance 
of the conditional price expectation, a result which is intuitively 
appealing. It is entirely appropriate to consider E(P|x) to be a 
forecast of P, and the variance of E(p|x) to be a measure of the 
accuracy of that forecast. In terms of regression, the variance of 
the conditional expectation would correspond to a mean square 
regression sum of squares. 
It is interesting that the value of information does not depend 
directly upon the degree of variation in the forecast error. Suppose 
that the random variables P and X are related by the expression 
P = X + e, where e is a random variable that is independent of X with 
zero mean. The variable e may be interpreted as "noise", with the amount 
of noise increasing with the variance of e. The value of knowing x is 
then 
vb). ïsia 
which does not depend upon the amount of noise in the system. The point 
is that when considering the value of information, it is how much of 
the variation in the price that can be explained by the information that 
is important, and not how much is left unexplained. 
Also note that the value of information is inversely related to 
the cost of production paratmer A. As A becomes larger, the firm becomes 
less responsive to changes in the expected price. That is, the firm's 
supply curve becomes steeper, and the change in output that results 
from a given change in expected price becomes smaller. Information 
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has value only because it allows the firm to alter its supply decision 
in a way that increases expected profit. Consequently, as the firm 
becomes less responsive to price changes, the value of information 
decreases. 
This result is easily extended to the situation in which the supply 
function of the firm is constrained to be a linear function of x: 
Q(x) = b + dx . 
The problem facing the firm is to choose the constants b and d that 
maximize unconditional expected profit: 
Max E [P(b + dX) - -J- (b + dX)^ ] . 
b,d P,X 
This is equivalent to the minimization problem: 
Min E (Z - (b + dX))2 
b,d Z,X 
where 
which is immediately recognized as a least squares problem. The 
solutions for b and d are 
b = E(z) - dE(X) 
.. Cov(z,X) 
Var(X) • 
The firm's supply rule may be written 
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;(%) . 
and the value of observing x is 
v(x) = ^  Var(LS(P|x)) .  
where LS(P|X) is the linear least squares predictor of P given X. 
This result is important because in many econometric applications of 
models containing expectations, it is assumed that conditional 
expectations are equivalent to linear least squares forecasts. 
VJhen several information variables are available, the value of 
information can be obtained by straightforward extensions of these 
procedures. For example, suppose there is another information 
variable, W, which is available at the time the supply decision is 
made. The value of acquiring both x and w is given by 
v(x,w) =-^  Var(E(p|x,W)) . 
If the firm has already decided to acquire x, the value of also 
acquiring w is given by 
v(w|x) = ^  [Var(E(P|X,W)) - Var(E(p|x))] . (1.2) 
The value of additional information is proportional to the increase in 
the variance of the conditional expectation of price that results from 
acquiring the extra information. 
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2.2 The Value of Information in a Homogeneous Market 
We now consider how the parameters describing the complete market 
affect the value of information to an individual firm. We begin by 
specifying the structure of the market. 
Let the market be composed of N risk neutral firms, where N is a 
large fixed integer. Let each firm's production process take one unit 
of time so that production decisions made at time (t-1) are realized at 
time t. The commodity being produced is nonstorable and there are no 
futures markets. There are no unplanned disturbances in the production 
process, so that planned production equals realized production. Let 
each firm have an identical quadratic cost function as specified in 
Section 1 
C(Y^  = -f- A > 0 and k = 1,2,...,N , 
where Y, is the production level of the k'th firm. 
K, t 
At time (t-1), when a production decision must berdade, the market 
price that will prevail at time t is unknown. Let each firm possess 
some vector of information,  ^ such that the joint density 
f(Pt,Ik exists. It was shown in Section 1 that the optimal 
production decision for the k'th firm is given by 
k - 1-2 " 
where E(P^ |lj^  ^  ^ ) is the stochastic expectation of the price that will 
prevail at time t conditional upon information observed at time (t-1) 
by the k'th firm. 
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Let the market demand for the commodity at time t, Q^ , be a linear 
function of the price at time t, an exogenous random variable x^  and a 
random disturbance U^ : 
QJ = B - DP^. + XJ. + UJ. , 
where B and D are positive constants. It is assumed that the disturbance 
is a sequence of zero mean, independent, identically distributed 
random variables. When a variable is specified to be exogenous, it is 
meant that the stochastic behavior of the variable is in no way dependent 
upon the sequence of errors U^ . 
Finally, market equilibrium requires that quantity demanded equals 
the total quantity supplied at time t: 
< • J.  ^
In order to determine how the market parameters A, D, and N affect 
the value of information, some simplifying assumptions will be made. 
It will be assumed that all firms use the same information set: 
1^  k = 1,2, ...,N , 
and that I^  is composed only of exogenous variables. 
The model being analyzed can then be written as 
Qt = IT sPt . 
qd = B - DP^  + , 
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where 
qf = q: , 
GPt = B(Ptl:t_i) 
It will also be assumed that is a covariance stationary process with 
a zero mean and that the conditional expectation of given I^  
E(X^ |l^ _l), exists, and is also covariance stationary. The component of 
X^  that cannot be predicted using I^ _^  is defined as e^ : 
Equation (1.1) shows that the value to an individual firm of knowing 
I^ _^ , v(I^  ^ ), is proportional to the variance of the conditional price 
expectation, Var(EP^ ). In order to specify this variance, it is necessary 
to find an expression for EP^  in terms of the exogenous variables in the 
model. The market model may be solved for the equilibrium price in 
terms of EP^ , X^ , and 
ft - IT = + %c + "t - IT EPc - (2-1) 
In order for the market to be in equilibrium, the sequence of prices 
defined by Equation (2.1) must be such that agents' expectations are 
fulfilled. To find this sequence, we take the conditional expectation 
of both sides of Equation (2.1) with respect to I^  ^  and solve for 
EPj., giving 
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so that the value of knowing  ^is 
• v(It-l) 2 ^ "(^ (^ tl^ t-l)) " 
2(DA + N) t t i 
Substituting the expression for EP^  into Equation (2.1), the equilibrium 
market price may be written as; 
ft - sPt + IT («t + "t) • 
Information is valuable because it permits a firm to forecast future 
price levels. Prices change from period to period because the random 
variables and shift the demand curve. However, information avail­
able at time t-1 is of use in forecasting only X^ . The value of informa­
tion is therefore directly related to the amount of variation in the 
price that is caused by X^  and which can be explained by 
In the expression for the value of information, the component 
Var (E(X^  I Ij._^ ) determines how much of the variation in X^  can be 
explained by I^  while the remainder determines the degree to which 
variation in X^  causes variation in the market price P^ . 
It is obvious that the value of information is a decreasing 
function of the demand slope parameter D, and the number of firms in 
the industry N. T^ Jhen these parameters decrease, there is an increase 
in the change in market price that results from a given change in 
demand, or, the variance of the market price increases. Because the 
value of information is derived from its usefulness in predicting 
changes in price, that value increases as the potential changes become 
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larger. We may conclude that when market parameters change in a way 
that makes the market price more volatile, the incentives for 
gathering information become greater. 
Taking the derivative of the value function with respect to the 
cost parameter A, it is easy to show that 
 ^v(x) > 0 if N/A > D 
4r v(x) <0 if N/A < D QA 
so that the effect on the value of information depends upon the 
relative slopes of the demand and supply curves. This indeterminancy 
arises because as A becomes larger, the market price becomes more 
volatile, which increases the incentives for gathering information, 
but the ability of firms to respond to price changes is dampened, 
which reduces the incentives for gathering information. 
It should be noted that these comparative statics are derived on 
the assumption the contains only exogenous information, so that 
the variance of is fixed with respect to the parameters 
A, D, and N. The value of information when expectations are based upon 
endogenous information will be discussed shortly. 
2.3 The Value of Information in a Heterogeneous Market 
An interesting problem is the effect on the value of information 
when firms do not all use the same information set. A convenient way 
to analyze the problem is to define two disjoint information sets, say 
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11^  and 12^ . It is assumed that the conditional expectations E(X^ |ll^  
and E(Xj. I Ilj._j^ , I2^ _^ ) exist, and that they form covariance stationary 
time series. It will be assumed that 11^  is public information that is 
used by all firms, and 12^  is private information that is used by only 
ng of the firms (0 < ng < N). 
Define: 
EPlt = E(Pjll^ ..^ ) 
and 
EP2^  -
so that EPlj. is the price expectation based upon public information 
and EP2^  is the price expectation based upon both public and private 
information. In order to reduce notation, it will be assumed that 
the supply parameter A and the demand parameter D both equal 1 
A = D = 1 . 
This assumption does not change any of the conclusions that will follow. 
Market supply at time t is then given by 
QS^  = n^  EPl^  + ng EP2^  , 
where 
n^ + ng = N .  
The equilibrium market price at time t is 
Pt = B + + Ut - ni EPl^  - n^  DP2^  . (3.1) 
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In order to find the value of the two information sets, we need to 
find expressions for EPl^  and EP2^  in terms of the exogenous variables 
in the model. Toward this end, it is useful to define 
EXl^  = E(XJll^ ._^ ) , 
EX2^  = E(Xt|llt_i, I2c_i) , 
and 
= Xf - EX2^  . 
It is assumed that the information sets are useful in predicting X^  so 
that 
Var(EX2^ ) > Var(EXl^ ) > 0 . 
We will first find an expression for EPl^ . Taking the conditional 
expectation of both sides of Equation (3.1) with respect to Il^ _^  gives 
EPlj. = B + EXlj. - EPl^  - n^  E(EP2j. | Il^ _j^ ) . 
Because 11^  ^  is a subset of the set used to generate the conditional 
expectation EP2^ , we have 
E(EP2^ |ll^ _^ ) = EPlj. , 
so that 
B + EXl 
" l + N • (3-2) 
We now find an expression for EP2^ . Taking the conditional expecta­
tion of both sides of Equation (3.1) with respect to I2^ _^  gives 
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EP2^  = B + EX2^  - E(EP1^  | " ^2 ' 
The conditional expectation of EPl^  taken with respect to 11^  ^  and 
I2^ _^  is exactly EPl^  so that 
B + EX2 - n. EPl 
:'"T = MIR—- (3-3) 
If we define the random variable as 
EX2. - EXl. 
t^ " 1 + n„ 
then, by substitution 
EP2j. = EPl^  + . 
The equilibrium market price is given by 
= EP2^  + (e^  + Uj.) . 
From Equation (1.1), the value of knowing 11^  ^  is 
v(Il. )^ V^ar(EXl.) (3.4) 
2(1 + 
and from Equation (1.2), the value of knowing 12^  ^  in addition to 
Ilt_l is 
v(I2^ _^ |ll^ _^ ) =^ Var(Wj.) . (3.5) 
Because EXl^  and EX2^  are covariance stationary time series, the 
values v(Il^  ^ ) and v(l2^ _^ Jll^ _^ ) are constant at all points in time. 
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for a given level of ng. Consequently, the time subscripts on the value 
functions will be suppressed in the sequel. 
In order to show how the dispersion of private information affects 
the value of information in this market, it is necessary to specify in 
greater detail the stochastic relationship between the exogenous 
variable X. and the information sets 11^  , and 12 , . t t-1 t-1 
We again consider the situation in which all information is 
exogenous. For example, if the values of were published by the 
government one time period after they occurred, then it would be reason­
able to specify 
I^ t-l " (^ t-2' \-3' \-4' 
and 
so that only the firms with private information observe the current 
value of X^  at the time they form expectations. 
Differentiating the value functions v(Il) and v(l2|ll) with 
respect to ng shows how the value of information changes when the 
proportion of firms using private information changes. When 11^  and 
12^  are composed of exogenous information, the variances of the con­
ditional expectations EXl^  and EX2^  are fixed with respect to ng. From 
Equations (3.4) and (3.5), it follows that 
and 
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 ^(v(I2|ll)) = y [Var(EXl^ ) - Var(EX2^ )] < 0 . 
2 2(1 + ^ ^ 
We can conclude that the value of public information is unaffected 
by the presence of private information, but that the value of private 
information is inversely related to the number of firms that possess it. 
Note that as more firms use private information, the variation in 
that can be explained using public information does not change, so 
that the expected profit of firms using only public information is 
constant. Now, as the market price becomes more stable, the amount of 
variation that can be explained by private information in fact decreases, 
so that the expected profit of firms using private information decreases 
as more firms become fully informed. We may conclude that as more firms 
decide to use private information, they create negative externalities 
for the firms already making use of private information. 
The preceding analysis has been based on the assumption that there 
is some "core" of information, 11^ , that all firms have in common. As 
noted in the introduction, an intuitively appealing specification for 
such a set would be the past history of the market price that the firms 
are trying to predict, . This situation differs from the case in which 
all information is exogenous because the joint distribution of X^ , which 
the firms must predict, and Il^ _^  is no longer fixed with respect to the 
number of firms using private information. 
In order to obtain results in this situation, it Is useful to make 
several simplifying assumptions. The information sets 11^  and 12^  will 
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be defined to be composed of the entire past history of the variables 
and X^ , respectively: 
lit (^ t' ^ t-1' ^ t-2' 
and 
12^  - (Xj., X^ _^ , X^ _2, ...) . 
The exogenous variable will be assumed to be an invertible first 
order moving average process 
X^  = et + bet_^ , |b| < 1 . 
The sequences of variables e^  and are each assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed with zero mean. 
It will also be assumed that the firm's supply rules are constrained 
to be linear functions of the elements of their information sets. As 
shown in Section 1, this implies that the firm's expectations take the 
form of least squares forecasts. The expectations in the following 
section should be interpreted as such. 
We need to find the conditional expectation of taken with 
respect to II^ '^ Now, X^  has a representation as an infinite auto-
regressive process; 
1=1 
SO that 
EX2. = Z (-b)l X = be . 
t t-1 t-1 
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Substitution of Equation (3.3) into Equation (3.1), and using the above 
expression to evaluate EX2^ , gives: 
1 n *1 Ft = B _ EPl; + Yt , (3.6) 
where 
\ • oTig "s-i + St + -
An expression for EPl^  will be found by using the method of 
undetermined coefficients, just as Muth (1960) did in his original 
paper. As discussed in Appendix A, has a representation as an 
invertible first order moving average process 
?t = ft + cft-1 ' Ic| < 1 
where the f^  are a sequence of uncorrelated random variables with zero 
mean and constant variance. 
Let us initially assume that has a representation as some 
invertible, infinite moving average process 
ft " G + \ \-l 
1=0 
where 6 is some constant, d^  = 1, and the are a sequence of 
uncorrelated, identically distributed random variables with zero mean, 
so that 
i=l 
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If the expectations of the firms are to be fulfilled, then from Equation 
(3.6) it follows that 
® \ "t-i ' r+ic - % =t-i) + 't + ''t-i 
1=0 I 2 1=1 
so that 
® +1-;-!; Vi * rli^  + ^  • 
In order for.this expression to hold at all points in time, it must be 
the case that 
B 
1 + N 
Zt = ft all t 
and 
1 + n„ 
di = ï-ï-nT c 1 = 1 
dU = 0 i = 2,3,..., . 
Consequently, the price sequence must be the invertible first order 
moving average 
B 1 2^ 
t^ = 1 + N t^ 1 + N  ^^ t-1 ' 
which satisfies our initial assumptions about P^ , and then 
EXl^  = (1 + n^ ) c fj._^  . 
Thus, 
30 
and 
where 
Gflc - TTN (B + (1 + •'2> • 
EP2^  = EPl^  + , 
EX2; _ EXl; bet_i 
\ = -imr— = - c^ t-i • 
The same method of solution may be used to solve for the price 
expectations when takes on any invertible autoregressive moving 
average form. A moving average of order one was chosen in this work 
because it facilitates the following comparative statics. 
Through tedious algebra, which is placed in Appendix A, it can be 
shown that 
3% ' ° 
and 
 ^ (v(I2|ll)) < 0 
dnz 
where v(II) and v(I2|ll) are defined in Equations (3.4) and (3.5). 
Thus, as the number of firms using private information increases, 
the value of private information to an individual firm decreases and 
the value of public information increases. Recall that when all infor­
mation was exogenous, the value of public information was constant. 
When firms use the past history of prices as the core of their 
information set, the use of private information by additional firms 
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creates positive externalities for firms using public information and 
negative externalities for firms using private information. The reason 
for the negative externalities is the same as when all information was 
exogenous. The reason for the positive externalities is that, when 
more firms use private information they change the stochastic behavior 
of the market price so that it is more useful in predicting the 
future value of X(t). 
Grossman (1977) and Green (1977) reach conclusions similar to 
these in their analysis of exchange markets. In particular, they note 
that the increased use of private information creates positive 
externalities for the agents using only market price as information. 
However, they do not discuss any negative externalities created for 
the users of private information. These authors also demonstrate that 
if there is no "noise" in the system, then observing the mar Icet price is 
equivalent, in terms of forecasting, to observing the actual exogenous 
variable. This result also holds in a market of production. If the 
disturbance is identically zero, then observing the past history of 
prices fully reveals the past history of X^ . 
2.4 Social Welfare 
In this section, the socially optimal level of information usage in 
the market will be compared to the level attained under perfect 
competition. The model to be analyzed is described in the previous 
section, with all the firms in the market using some public set of 
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information when forming expectations, but only some portion of the 
firms using a set of private information. It will be assumed that 
public information is costless, but that there is a fixed cost, C, of 
obtaining the set of private information in each time period. One may 
imagine that there is an information service that will supply private 
information to each firm at a cost of C dollars per time period. 
We first consider the level of information usage attained in a 
perfectly competitive market. Because public information is valuable, 
yet costless, all firms will make use of it when forming expectations. 
The interesting question is how many of the firms will subscribe to 
the information service. This number will be denoted by n°. Recall that 
the value to an individual firm of obtaining I2^ _^  in addition to 11^  ^  
is 
v(l2 JllJ = 
't' t' 2 
where 
= Var(W^ ) . 
2 
The notation reflects the fact that a^ (n2) is a function of ng, the . 
number of firms that make use of the private Information. For the 
2 
market structures discussed in Section 2.3, o^ Cng) is a monotonically 
decreasing function of ng. The value of 12^  ^  is then maximized when 
ng = 0, and is minimized when ng = N. Firms will acquire I2^ _^  as 
long as the resulting increase in expected profit is greater than the 
cost of the information. Consequently, if 
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j- < c . 
then none of the firms will find it profitable to acquire 12^ , and 
n^  = 0. If 
F > C . 
then all of the firms in the industry will find it profitable to 
acquire 12^ , and n° = N. A third possible outcome exists when 
ctJ(O) > C > -i- . 
If this inequality holds, then firms will acquire 12^ , causing its value 
to fall, until some n^  is reached where 
IT = C 
so that n° of the firms will use 12^  and the remainder will not. 
We now consider the level of information usage that is socially 
optimal. Because prices and quantities in this model are stochastic, 
it will be assumed that maximizing the expected value of social welfare 
is of interest, where social welfare is the sum of the producer surplus 
and consumer surplus. The producer surplus for a firm is defined to 
be total revenue minus total variable cost, and the total producer 
surplus is the sum over all the firms of each individual producer 
surplus. Consumer surplus is defined to be that sum over all consumers 
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of the maximum price each would be willing to pay for the commodity minus 
the price they actually pay. 
We loiow from Section 1.1 that the expected value of the producer 
surplus for the k'th firm, PS^ ,^ ignoring the cost of information, is 
given by 
E(PS^ )^ = E(EP^ ) = -|- (M + Var(EP^ )) , 
1 2 
where M = -z B . The total expected producer surplus for this 
(1 + m 
market is then, 
E(PS^ ) = Z E(PS^ )^ = ^  [M + Var(EPl^ )) 
k=l 
+ ngCM-t Var(EP2^ )] 
= -Y [N(M + Var(EPl^ )) + n^  ^ (^ng)] . 
The expected value of total consumer surplus is given by 
E(CSt) = -y E((pl - P^ )Q^ ) , 
where P^  is the intercept of the demand curve at time t. Recall that 
Xj. may be written as 
X, = EX2^  + , 
where e^  is the component of that cannot be predicted using both 
II. 1 and 12. ,. Then, t—1 t—± 
35 
= (1 + N) EPlj. + (1 + Hg) Wj. + 
and 
Pt = EPlt + "t + *t + "t 
so that 
- Pf = N EPl^  + ng . 
The total quantity supplied at time t is given by 
Qt = N EPl^  + n^  
so that, 
E(CSt) = [N^ (M + Var(EPl^ )) + n^  (n^ )] . 
The cost of supplying the information set 12^  to n^  of the firms 
in the industry is C'ng, so that the expected value of the total social 
welfare, E(SW^ ), that arises from the production of this commodity is 
given by 
E(SW^ ) = E(PS^ ) + E(CS^ ) - n^ C 
= ^  [(N^  + N)(M + Var(EPl^ )) 
2 2 
+ (ng + n^ ) O^ Cng)] - n^ C . 
We are interested in the value of n^ , n^ , which maximizes expected social 
welfare. First, consider the situation in which both 11^  and 12^  are 
composed of exogenous information. Recall that the variance of EPl^  is 
fixed in this situation. Differentiating E(SW^ ) with respect to ng and 
36 
setting the result equal to zero yields the following condition for an 
extremum: 
T 4^4) = G. 
* 
Two values of n^  satisfy this condition, one positive and one negative. 
It is easily verified that the above condition characterizes the maximum 
level of expected total social welfare when the positive solution is 
chosen. 
Because n2 is bounded above by N and below by zero, there are two 
possible corner solutions to this maximization problem. They are 
4 - " " -T : = 
and 
n* = N if 4" 0^ (N) > C . 
6 Z W — 
The values of ng defined above are identical to the values n^  which 
occur in the competitive market. Thus, when all information is exogenous, 
the market equilibrium level of information usage is identical to the 
socially optimal level. Even though the use of private information 
creates negative externalities for other firms in the market, these 
losses are offset by the gains to consumers that result from more stable 
prices. 
Let us now consider the situation in which public information is 
endogenous and private information is exogenous. In this case, both 
Var(EPl^ ) and Var(EP2^ ) are functions of n^ . Define 
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= Var(EXl^ ) 
where the notation reflects the fact that the variance of EXl^  is a 
function of ng. Differentiating the expected social welfare function 
with respect to ng and setting this result equal to zero yields the 
condition for an extremum: 
(N - n^ ) 
(1 + N) (1 + n^ ) 
(°IL = C 
It is shown in Appendix A that the value of n^  that satisfies this 
equality maximizes the expected level of social welfare. As before, 
there are two corner solutions to this optimization problem, defined by 
n* = N if -y a^ (N) 2 C 
It is also shown in Appendix A that for values of C such that 0 < n^  < N, 
the equilibrium number of firms using private information is less than is 
o * 
socially optimal, or n^  < n^ . Consequently, the competitive market will 
underutilize private information when firms use the past history of 
prices as the core of their information set. This is due to the positive 
externalities created by the use of private information. These results 
would justify the activities of the government in the dissemination of 
information. 
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3. MODEL ESTIMATION WITH RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
In the preceding chapter, the problem of optimal information usage 
by economic agents who form expectations rationally was analyzed. One 
of the most important conclusions was that there may be positive 
externalities associated with the use of information, so that the 
market may fail in reaching a socially optimal allocation of this re­
source. This is just one example of how the assumption of rationality 
has led to an improved understanding of the behavior of individuals 
in markets which involve expectations of future events. Because the 
assumption of rationality was crucial to the analysis presented in 
Chapter 2, it is of interest to test the rational expectations hypothesis 
empirically. 
The following chapter is a brief review of the methods that have 
been developed to estimate models that contain expectations and of the 
associated tests of rationality. Special consideration is given to 
the applicability of these methods in light of the conclusions from 
Chapter 2 that market equilibrium does not imply that agents use all 
the information that is available when forming expectations, nor that 
all agents use identical sets of information. 
Price expectations are usually not directly observable, but the 
actions that agents take in response to their expectations, such as the 
supply decision of a firm, often are. In order to make inferences 
about the way that economic agents actually form expectations, it is 
necessary to construct and estimate models which explain these 
observable response variables. 
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The estimation of models containing price expectations, and the 
subsequent testing of the hypothesis of rationality, may proceed along 
one of two general lines. The first may be considered a full-information 
approach, in which the complete specification of the model describing 
the market of interest is used to obtain an expression, in terms of 
observable variables, of the actual price expectation of the agents. 
This expression is then substituted for the unobserved price expectation, 
so that the model may be estimated using standard techniques. The 
second is a limited-information approach in which a single equation of 
interest is chosen from the complete system of equations. The price 
expectation in this equation is represented by an appropriate measure, 
which contains error, and the equation is estimated using instrumental 
variable techniques. Two variations of instrumental variable estimators 
have been developed, which differ in their treatment of serial correlation 
in the error in the equation. 
3.1 Full Information Estimation Techniques 
We will first describe the full-information approach to the 
estimation and testing of models containing rational expectations. This 
methodology was first developed by Lucas (1972) and by Nelson (1975) and 
later expanded by Wallis (1980) and by Revankar (1980). 
Suppose that a complete system of equations may be written: 
AY^  + BY* + CXj. = Uj. , (1.1) 
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where is a Gxl vector of endogenous variables, is a Kxl vector of 
exogenous variables, is a Gxl vector of unobserved independent 
identically distributed random errors, and is a Gxl vector of 
* I 
expectations of the elements of Y^  formed at time (t-1); Y^  = E(Y^ |l^  ^ ). 
The parameter matrices A, B, and C are of dimension GxG, GxG, and GxK, 
respectively. Estimation of the parameters of the system requires 
* 
specification of the elements of the vector Y^ . 
A 
Define as: 
K • 
Taking the conditional expectation of both sides of Model (1.1) with 
respect to gives: 
A A A  
AY^  + BY^  + CXj. = 0 , 
which may be solved for Y^ : 
Y* = - (A + B)"^  CX* (1.2) 
It is assumed that the econometriclan can identify the stochastic 
processes generating the exogeneous variables in the model so that 
the exact form of the system of equations: 
Xj - X* = (1.3) 
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may be specified, where is assumed to be a vector of k independent, 
identically distributed errors. The information set is generally 
assumed to be composed of the past history of the exogenuous variables 
in the model. The conditional expectation will then take the form 
of the one-step forecast generated by the autoregressive moving 
average model describing the exogenuous variables. 
Augmenting the original system given in (1.1) by that given in (1.3) 
and substituting expression (1.2) for the unobservable expectation 
gives the complete system of equations: 
AY - B(A +B)"^  CX* + ex. = U. 
(1.4) 
which contains no unobserved variables, and may be estimated by suitable 
nonlinear techniques. 
Both Wallis (1980) and Revankar (1980) demonstrate how the 
methodology may be extended to models which include expectations of 
endogenous variables that will occur beyond time t and to models that 
contain lagged values of the exogenous variables. Hoffman and Schmidt 
(1981) and Pesaran (1981) discuss the conditions necessary for the 
model to be identified. 
Tests of the rational expectations hypothesis in this framework 
arise from the restrictions placed upon the coefficients of the model 
by the hypothesis. The unrestricted form of the model is given by: 
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AY^  - DX* + CX^  = t t t t 
- Xt = Vt 
(1 .5)  
where D is a GxK matrix. Now, for example, the model may be estimated 
in both restricted (1.4) and unrestricted (1.5) form, and a log-likelihood 
ratio may be used to test the validity of the restrictions. Different 
variations of this basic test strategy are discussed by Wallis (1980) 
and Revankar (1980). Examples of the application of these methods are 
given in Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) and Hoffman and Schlagenhauf (1983). 
3.2 Limited Information Estimation Techniques 
The limited information method of estimating rational expectations 
models differs from that described in the previous section because there 
is no attempt to explicitly construct measures of agents' price 
expectations. Instead, a proxy variable is used in place of the price 
expectation, and the model is estimated using instrumental variable 
techniques. 
Suppose that a single equation of interest, drawn from the 
complete system of equations, has the form 
\ • h^ t-l \ + "t • (2-1) 
The variables and are observable, is an unobserved structural 
error, and  ^ is a price expectation formed by economic agents at 
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time (t-1) of a price, P^ , that will prevail at time t. An equation of 
this form would arise if, for example, one were modeling the supply 
decision of a firm in which production decisions are made one period 
prior to the marketing of the product. Define to be the set of 
variables that agents observe at time t. It is assumed that the sequence 
of variables (P^ ., I^ ) are such that the conditional expectation 
exists. Given the assumption of rationality, the price 
expectation may then be expressed as: 
t-1 • 
The parameters of the model given in (2.1) cannot be estimated 
directly because the price expectation is not observable. However, 
McCallum (1976b) notes that the realized price, P^ , is a measure with 
error of the price expectation, where the error in measurement is 
exactly the agents' forecast error. This error will be denoted f^ , 
defined by 
ft - ft - • 
Writing Model (2.1) in terms of P^  gives: 
Yt = Pf + Bg Xj. + v^  , (2.2) 
where 
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Using as a proxy for the price expectation results in Model 
(2.2) in which all the explanatory variables are observable, but it 
introduces a new problem because the explanatory variable will be 
correlated with the composite error v^ . As is well-loiown, using 
ordinary least squares to estimate such an equation will yield biased 
estimates of the parameters and Bg. 
The correlation between P^  and v^  arises from two sources. First, 
the covariance between P^  and f^ , the measurement error component of 
v^ , is exactly equal to the variance of f^ . This is the standard 
problem that arises in measurement error models. Second, the variable 
will usually be a factor in the determination of the realized price 
P^ , so that P^  is correlated with the structural error in the model, 
u^ . This is the standard problem of simultaneity, and will surely 
arise if is measuring market supply. 
The usual procedure in the presence of such problems is some form 
of instrumental variable estimation. McCallum (1976b) notes that a 
natural source for the required instruments is the information set 
Let be a IxK (K>=2) row vector of variables that are chosen 
from the set  ^with the property that they are uncorrelated with the 
structural error u.. If these variables are correlated with the t 
explanatory variables P^  and X^ , then they possess the general properties 
necessary to make them valid instrumental variables, and the equation 
may be estimated using standard techniques. 
If N values of the variables in Model (2.2) observed, then the 
model may be written: 
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Y = XB + V 
where Y and V are Nxl vectors, B is the 2x1 vector (B^ , Bg)', and X 
is the Nx2 matrix of observations on and Let Z be the NxK 
matrix of observations of the instrumental variables. The 
instrumental variable estimator of B is given by 
B = (X'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z*X)"^ X'Z(Z'Z)~^ Z*Y . (2.3) 
Given appropriate conditions on the behavior of the variables in the 
1/2 
model, the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of N (B - B) is 
given by: 
N (X ' Z (Z ' Z) "^Z ' X) ~\ar (v^) 
It is of interest not only to estimate the parameters of model 
(2.1) but also to empirically test the rational expectations hypothesis. 
Within the framework developed above, the major implication of 
rationality is that the forecast error f^  is uncorrelated with the set 
of instruments and consequently, with the vector of instruments 
While it is not possible to obtain an estimate of the forecast 
error fthe residuals computed using the estimator given in (2.3) 
are an estimate of the composite error v^ , which is a linear function 
of the errors f^  and u^ . The hypothesis that the error v^  is 
uncorrelated with the vector of instruments Z^  by be evaluated by 
using a test of over-identification, as originally developed by Anderson 
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and Rubin (1950) and by Basmann (1960a). The use of this procedure to 
test the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis has just 
recently been noted by Startz (1983). 
There are several ways of motivating tests of over-identification. 
Startz (1983), develops the test by considering restrictions placed 
upon the parameters of the three equations which express the variables 
Y^ , P^ , and as linear functions of the variables that are the 
elements of vector Z^ . An alternative motivation is the following. 
We wish to test the hypothesis that the elements of are 
uncorrelated with the variable v^ . This implies the model 
V = Z9 + V , 
where 0 is a Rxl vector of zeros. If the vector v was observable and 
composed of independent and identically distributed random variables, 
one could estimate 0 by ordinary least squares and then perform a 
standard test of the hypothesis that 0=0. The test statistic would 
2 be distributed as a x with K degrees of freedom under the null 
hypothesis. 
While V is not directly observable, it is possible to obtain an 
estimate of v, assuming 0 = 0, as the vector of residuals; 
V = y - XB (2.4) 
where B is defined in (2,3). Basmann (1960a) shows that v^  is re-* 
gressed on Z^ , then the regression sum of squares divided by the 
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standardized error sum of squares is asymptotically distributed as a 
2 X with (K-2) degrees of freedom. The degrees of freedom are reduced 
by 2 because the vector of residuals v are orthogonal to 2 linear 
combinations of the instrumental variables by construction. If Model 
(2.1) had contained G explanatory variables, the test statistic would 
have K-G degrees of freedom. 
Of course, the validity of the test is contingent upon a number 
of conditions, including proper model specification, correctly 
identifying as a subset of and choosing to be independent 
of the structural error in the equation. 
T'Jhile instrumental variable techniques will yield consistent 
estimates of the parameters of Model (2.1), they will not generally be 
efficient, and the test described above will be valid only if the 
error v^  forms a sequence of zero mean, independent random variables. 
3.3 Corrections for Serial Correlation 
In this section, estimation strategies when the error v^  is 
serially correlated are discussed. Because of differences in the 
assumptions underlying this model and those of the standard 
econometric model, conventional methods of correction are not 
appropriate. 
Serial correlation in the composite error v^  may arise from 
either the structural error in the equation u^  or the forecast error 
f^ . Models in which the forecast error is the source of the 
48 
correlation are of particular interest in this analysis. One situation 
in which the forecast error is likely to be serially correlated is 
when the sampling interval is shorter than the length of the forecast 
horizon. This will be the case, for example, in a model describing the 
supply decision of a firm in which the production process takes two 
months to complete, but production decisions and data observations are 
made on a monthly basis. This particular model is of interest because 
it forms the basis of the empirical work that is presented in Chapter 4. 
Other situations in which the forecast error will be serially correlated 
are discussed in Cumby et al. (1983), and the following analysis may be 
generalized to cover these cases. 
We wish to consider a model of the form; 
= »! t-h P* + ^ 2 + "t (3-1) 
where is a price expectation formed by economic agents at time 
(t-h) of the price that will prevail at time t, with h > 1. This 
model may be expressed in the form given in (2.2), with the agents' 
forecast error defined as: 
ft - ft - E(ftllt-h) • 
It will be assumed that the agents never throw away information once 
it is obtained so that 
^t ^ ^t+1 ^ \+2 ' • 
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It is also assumed that agents observe their forecast errors so that the 
information set I^  contains the past history of forecast errors: 
(ft» t^-1' ^ t-2* *••')'" t^ ' 
Given these assumptions, forecast errors that are h or more time 
periods apart will be uncorrelated, but those that are less than h 
time periods apart will, in general, be correlated. That is; 
Cov(f^ , f^ _^ ) 0 , i = 0, 1, 2, ..., h-1 . 
(3.2) 
Cov(fj., = 0 » i = h, h+1, h+2, ... 
This result is a consequence of the assumption of rationality, 
which implies that the error f^  is uncorrelated with all the elements 
of I^ _^ . Because I^ _^  contains the past history of forecast errors 
(f^ _l^ , ...), forecast errors that are h or more time periods 
apart will be uncorrelated. However, the sequence of errors 
(f^ _2, f^ _2» t^-h-1^  are not observed by agents at the time the 
price expectation is formed. Because the agents cannot observe 
the errors that result from the (h-1) previous forecasts, they cannot 
take that information into account when forming new predictions. This 
does not guarantee that forecast errors that are less than h time 
periods apart will be correlated, but it does seem likely because some 
of the factors that cause the price at time, say (t-1), to deviate from 
the forecast formed at time (t-h-1), will also be partially responsible 
for the deviation of the price at time t from the forecast formed at 
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time (t-h). For example, if time is measured in months and h=2, the 
forecast of a price in March formed in January and the forecast of a 
price in April formed in February will both have an error that could 
be partially explained by the level of income in March. 
If the forecast error is serially correlated then, in general, 
the composite error v^  will also be. This serial correlation must 
be accounted for in order to obtain efficient parameter estimates and 
to be able to perform valid tests of hypotheses. 
In order to more precisely describe the behavior of the composite 
error, two additional assumptions will be made. First, that the 
structural error is a realization from a stationary autoregressive 
process of order p: 
Jo "t-i - ^  ' 
where a^  = 1, the roots of + a^  ^  ^+ ... + a^  = 0 are all less 
than one in absolute value, and e^  is a sequence of independent 
identically distributed random variables with zero mean and finite 
variance. An autoregressive model is commonly used to describe the 
behavior the structural disturbances in econometric models. It is 
not difficult to modify the following analysis to accommodate a moving 
average component in the description of u^ . Second, the time series 
defined by: 
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is a covariance stationary process with zero mean and strictly positive 
spectral density. Note that this implies that, in general, agents must 
correctly predict any deterministic compents of the price, P^ . 
Because of the structure of the covariance function of f^  given 
in (3.2), it follows from Fuller (1976, p.146) that the variable defined 
in (3.3) has a representation as a (p+h-l)'th order invertible moving 
average: 
 ^ Jo -^i - j!, ^  't-j 
where q=p+h-l, b^  = 1, the roots of + b  ^+ ... + b = ^ 0 are 
2 less than one in absolute value and the are uncorrelated (0, a ) 
random variables. 
It follows from the definition of v^  that 
or 
Jo "-3 
Consequently, the composite error v^  has a representation as a 
stationary invertible autoregressive moving average process of order 
(p,p+h-l). The error then has the infinite autoregressive representation: 
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where the c^ 's are defined in Fuller (1976, p.70). 
It is of interest that the composite error for the model given 
in (3.1) can be expected to have an error that contains a moving 
average component. It can be shown that the other common types of 
rational expectations models in which the forecast error is serially 
correlated will also contain a moving average component. 
Two somewhat different ways of correcting for serial correlation 
in the type of model being discussed have been presented in the 
literature. They both may be viewed as being types of generalized 
least squares estimators. 
We will first describe the generalized method of moments (GMM) 
estimator which has recently been developed by Hansen (1982). Given 
the matrix Z of observations of the instruments, the GMM estimator for 
the model under consideration is given by 
®GMM " (X'ZM"^ Z'X)~^ X'ZM~^ Z'Y , (3.4) 
assuming that M exists, it is defined to be the KxK matrix given by: 
M = lim — E(Z'W'Z) . 
n-x» ^ 
Hansen shows that this is the most efficient estimator of B, given the 
vector of instruments Z^ , in a particular class of instrumental 
variable estimators. Given reasonable regularity conditions, he 
demonstrates that N(Bg^  - B) is asymptotically normally distributed 
with variance-covariance matrix: 
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N^ (X'Z(M~^ )Z'X)~^  . 
In practice the matrix M will be estimated using the vector of 
residuals defined in (2.4) as an estimate of V. Hansen (1982), Cumby 
et al. (1983), and Hayashi and Sims (1983) all discuss ways in which 
this may be done. It will just be noted here that estimation of M 
does not require the specification of a parametric model describing 
the behavior of the error v^ . Examples of the application of this 
estimator can be found in Cumby et al. (1983) and Hansen and Hodrick 
(1980). 
The test of over-identification, which encompasses a test of 
rationality, that accompanies the GMM estimator is very similar to 
that discussed previously. It involves a test of the hypothesis that 
all the coefficients in a regression of the residuals generated by the 
estimator on the vector of instruments are zero. Hansen (1982) 
discusses the distribution of this test statistic in detail. 
The second method of estimation is based upon the more conventional 
generalized least squares estimator. Such estimators can be viewed as 
transforming the data in such a way that the error in the resulting model 
is serially uncorrelated. If an infinite number of observations were 
available, the standard transformation of Model (2.2) would be: 
=1 Pt-i \ =1 \-i + "f (3-5) 
i=0 i=0 1=0 
where (c^ , c^ , ...) are from the infinite autoregressive representation 
of v^ . 
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Flood and Garder (1980) were the first to note the problem that• 
such a transformation creates for instrumental variable estimation of 
the model under consideration. While the resulting error, w^ , is 
serially uncorrelated, it is also a function of the entire past history 
of forecast errors (f^ , f^ _^ , f^ _2> ••.)• This is clear when w^  is 
written as; 
00 CD 
"t • =1 "t-i + 
Because the assumption of rationality only guarantees that the forecast 
error f^  is uncorrelated with information observed at time (t-h), there 
does not exist a set of variables that are uncorrelated with w^  to use 
as instruments. The problem discussed above arises because the assumption 
of rationality only implies that: 
E(Vt*Zs) =0 s < t 
whereas, it is usually assumed that the set of instruments are 
uncorrelated with all past, present, and future values of the error in 
the equation. 
Hayashi and Sims (1983) note that has a forward representation: 
Jo 'i ^ 't+j • 
where the parameters (a^ , a^ , a^ ; b^ , b^ , b^ ) are defined 
2 previously and the r^  are the sequence of (0, a ) uncorrelated random 
variables defined by: 
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2 c V . (3.6) 
Model (2.2), when transformed in a "forward" manner, is 
Jq i^ ^ t+i " h JQ "=1 t^+i ®2 ''i \+± + ^t ' (3-7) 
The vector remains a valid set of instruments for the estimation 
of the model because r^  is a function of the future forecast errors 
(f^ , f...), all of which are uncorrelated with the elements of 
by assumption. Note that any instruments that contain stochastic 
components are not transformed. Instruments that are purely deterministic 
may be transformed because agents, in effect, know all past, present, and 
future values of them. 
In practice, it is not possible to transform the data into the 
infinite future. It is well-known that, given a fixed number of 
observations, the most efficient estimator of B when the elements of 
the matrix X are fixed is given by the generalized least squares 
estimator: 
B = (X'T'TX)~^ X'T'TY 
2 
where T is a NxN matrix such that T(E(vv*))T' = a I, Conventionally, 
T is chosen to be a lower triangular matrix (with the matrix X arranged 
so that the subscripts increases from top to bottom) which corresponds 
to the backward transformation given in (3.4). A natural analog to 
this estimator when instruments are required is: 
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B = (X'TZ(Z'Z) ^ Z'TX)~^ 'TZ(Z'Z) ^ Z'TY . (3.8) 
This is the estimator proposed by Hayashi and Sims (1983), only with 
the matrix T chosen to be upper triangular rather than lower, which 
corresponds to the forward transformation given in (3.5). 
It may be noted that in order for standard estimates of errors 
reported by computer packages to be correct, it is necessary to assume 
that: 
E(v^  Vg|z^ , Z^ _^ , ...) = E(v^  Vg), s < t . (3.9) 
so that serial correlations in v^  do not depend on past values of the 
instruments. Hayashi and Sims (1983) demonstrate that this \d.ll be 
the case, for example, if the sequence of random variables v^  are 
jointly normally distributed. Given the appropriate regularity 
conditions on the variables in the model, the asymptotic covariance 
1/2 ~ 
matrix of N (B - B) is given by: 
N(X'TZ(Z'Z)~~Z'T'X)"^ a^r(r^ ) (3.10) 
Using the results given by Hansen (1982), it is easy to show that 
this is most efficient estimator of 3, given the NxK matrix of K 
instruments defined by T'Z. Consequently, it is not possible to say 
whether the estimator defined in (3.4) or that defined in (3.8) is 
more efficient in a given situation. The GMM estimator does have the 
advantage that it is applicable when the assumption given in (3.9) is 
violated and when the moving average component of v^  contains a unit 
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root. The estimator given in (3.8) has the advantage that it incorporates 
any knowledge the econometrician may have about the actual process 
generating the error v^ . 
The only difficult part in computing the estimator given in (3.8) 
is the formation of the matrix T, or equivalently, affecting the 
appropriate forward transformation. When v^  has a finite autoregressive 
representation, of order p, forming T not difficult as the first (N-p) 
rows simply contain the autoregressive coefficients of v^ . However, 
when v^  contains a moving average component the construction of the matrix 
T can become computationally difficult. Standard computer software may 
introduce substantial errors in the computation of T when the sample size 
is large. 
Several methods of approximating T have been suggested in the 
literature. They are all based upon the fact that a stationary auto­
regressive moving average process may be approximated by a finite 
autoregressive process of order, say, k. If the moving average component 
contains no unit roots, the approximation improves as k increases. The 
methods differ in their choice of k and how the coefficients of the 
autoregressive approximation are computed. Once an autoregressive 
approximation is specified, the appropriate data transformation is 
implemented in the usual way as: 
jo Vi • «1 I ^  ^I 1 • 
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where the are the coefficients of a k'th order autoregressive 
approximation of the process v^ . 
Amemyia (1973) proposes that the coefficients d^  be estimated by 
regressing on v^ _^ , v^ _2, for t = k+l,...,n) where are 
residuals defined in (2.4). He notes that a problem exists in choosing 
the appropriate value for k. As larger values of k are selected, the 
theoretical approximation improves, but the efficiency of the estimated 
coefficients decreases. He notes that it does not appear too possible 
to derive an expression for the optimal choice of k, which depends upon 
the sample size N. He does show that for ordinary least squares 
estimators values for k and N exist such that the error in the approxi­
mation may be made arbitrarily small. 
Hayashi and Sims (1983) propose that the autoregressive approximation 
be formed by truncating the infinite representation given in (3.6) at 
length k (d^  = c^ , i = l,2,..,,k). The coefficients (c^ , c^ , ...» c^ ) 
are obtained from estimates of the parameters (a^ , a^ , ..., a^ , b^ , b^ , 
..., bq) of the actual autoregressive moving average representation of 
Vj.. These estimates are computed using the residuals defined in (2.4). 
An advantage of this approach is that Hayashi and Sims (1983) provide a 
rule for choosing k. They suggest that k be set equal to the square 
root of the sample size. Hayashi and Sims (1983) show that this estimator, 
given the proper assumptions regarding the behavior of the variables in 
the model, has the asymptotic variance^ -covariance matrix given in (3.10). 
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An approach suggested by Fuller (1976, p.425) is also based upon an 
approximation formed by truncating the infinite autoregressive representa­
tion of Vj.. However, rather than choosing a specific k, he suggests that 
each observation be transformed as far forward as is possible, given the 
available number of observations. The transformed model is given by: 
N-t N-t N-t N-t 
ifo jo ifo •=! ''t+1 + •=! "t+l • 
t = 1,2,...,N (3.11) 
In Appendix B, the properties of this estimator are derived in 
detail. The exact assumptions regarding the variables in the model are 
given, and it is demonstrated that the asymptotic variance-covariance 
matrix of the estimates is equal to that given in (3.10), and that the 
test of over-identification described in Section 2 remains valid after 
applying the transformation defined in (3.11). 
In all three of the approximations described, consideration must 
be given to the observations at the end of the sample. For those 
given by Amemyia (1973) and Hayashi and Sims (1983), the transformation 
does not exist for the last k observations in the data set. For that 
suggested by Fuller (1976, p. 425), the approximation is likely to be 
bad for the last few observations. Two possible solutions to this 
problem are to drop the first few observations, or to actually compute 
the first few rows of T based upon the estimated autocovariance function 
of v^ . 
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The question of which of the three transformations will perform 
better in practice does not appear to have a simple answer. That 
proposed-by Amemyia (1973) has the advantage of being relatively easy 
to implement using standard statistical software. Those suggested by 
Hayashi and Sims (1983) and by Fuller (1976, p. 425) have the advantage 
of incorporating any knowledge the econometriclan may have regarding 
the process generating the error v^  into the analysis. 
3.4 Comparison of Full and Limited Estimation Strategies 
In this section, a brief comparison of the full and limited informa­
tion estimation strategies is presented. Special consideration Is given 
to the applicability of these methods in light of the conclusions from 
Chapter 2 that market equilibrium does not imply that agents use all the 
information that is available when forming expectations, nor that all 
agents use identical sets of Information. 
The main advantage of the full information strategy for the estima­
tion of models containing expectations and the subsequent testing of 
the rational expectations hypothesis is that it possesses the powerful 
property of making use of all the information available in the model. 
This is an important characteristic and should not be under emphasized. 
However, two potential problems in the estimation of such models are 
minimized by the limited information approach. 
The first disadvantage of the full information method is that there 
is greater opportunity for model miss-specification than in the limited 
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information method. As more individual equations are added to a system, 
there is always greater potential that one is misspecified. This is 
especially true with respect to the model discussed in Section 1, for 
it contains not only the structural equations describing the economic 
system under consideration, but also the forecasting equations for the 
exogeneous variables. While analysts may disagree about the specifica­
tion of any equation within an econometric model, such disagreement is 
even more likely mth forecasting equations than structural equations 
because there is no economic basis on which to evaluate their form. For 
example, in their analysis of tests of the rational expecations 
hypothesis in macro-economic models, Hoffman and Schlagenhauf (1983) 
found that the outcome could be sensitive to the length of the autore-
gressive process assumed to describe the behavior of the exogeneous 
variables in the model, and that it was difficult to determine what the 
correct lag length should be. Because the limited information strategy 
involves the estimation of only one equation and does not require the 
construction of forecasting equations, the potential for misspecifica-
tion is minimized. 
A second disadvantage of the full information test of rationality 
is that it presumes that the econometrician is able to exactly identify 
the set of variables used by the typical agent when forming expectations. 
The authors who developed this estimation strategy argue that agents' 
information sets should be assumed to contain the exact list of variables 
which are considered exogenous is a given econometric model. As 
discussed by Fair (1979), this logic stems from the standard interpretation 
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of the rational expectations hypothesis, which is that the forecasts of 
economic agents should be identical to those of the 'relevant economic 
theory'. 
While the assumption that economic agents use exactly the same 
information as econometricians is attractive, this author believes that 
it is important to remember that most econometric models are developed 
with a specific goal in mind, and that simpler or more complex models 
could be specified if that suited the purpose of the econometrician. 
This does not imply that analysts can twist the rules of probability to 
suit their needs, but that a great deal of flexibility exists with 
respect to the extent of model development. 
To illustrate the point, in the following chapter an empirical 
analysis of the formation of expectations by the producers of chicken 
broilers is conducted. It is demonstrated that the price of beef is 
an important determinant of the demand for chicken broilers, and that 
the price of beef may be considered exogenous in the estimation of 
the boiler demand equation. Thus, it is perfectly acceptable to 
assume that the relevant economic model contain only equations 
describing broiler supply and broiler demand. On the other hand, a 
more complete system might also contain equations describing the 
supply and demand for beef. The use of the variables which enter those 
equations, such as the level of beef inventories and the number of 
cattle on farms, should allow one to form better forecasts of future 
beef prices than would be possible solely on the basis of past beef 
prices. Forecasting the future beef price is important because it is 
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a factor in the determination of the future broiler price. However, the 
system which excludes the beef supply and demand equations is in no sense 
'wrong.' In fact, both types of systems have appeared in the literature, 
with the choice depending upon the particular author's objectives. 
The important point is that the system actually chosen by the 
econometrician pursuing the estimation strategy described in Section 1 
will determine which variables ifill be assumed to enter the broiler 
producers information set. In one case in the example described above, 
the only information the broiler producers would possess concerning the 
beef market would be the past history of beef prices. In the other, 
the producers would also know the past history of all the determinants 
of beef demand and upply. There is no clear economic basis for 
determining which set of variables is correct. 
It was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that when information is viewed 
as a costly resource, the optimal level of information usage depends 
upon a number of factors. These include not only the value of informa­
tion in terms of forecasting the variable of interest, but also the 
values of the parameters that describe the economic system. It is 
possible that the profit maximizing level of information usage by 
economic agents could either be less than or greater than that implied 
by a particular econometric model. Consequently, the test of the 
hypothesis of rationality described in Section 1 may be rejected 
simply because the econometrician has chosen a model that is either 
too large or too small. Of course, the limited information strategy 
is not totally free of this problem. The econometrician must still 
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make a priori judgements about what variables are likely to be elements 
of agents information sets, but is freed of the restriction of actually 
specifying them all. 
It was shown in Chapter 2 that it is not necessary that all agents 
use the same set of information when forming expectations. In the full 
information method of estimation, this possibility is recognized and 
dealt with by assuming that the expectation defined in (1.2) is the mean 
over all agents. To demonstrate that the single equation approach is 
applicable when agents differ in the amount of information they use. 
Model (2.1) will be reconsidered in terms of the individual agents that 
make up the market under study. Assume that there are M agents 
producing the good in question and that each produces according to 
the model 
i^t ^  ®il ^ ^^ t'^ it-1^  ®i2 \ "it  ^^   ^' 
For the i'th producer, 1^ .^ ^  is the information set used in forming 
expectations, is the level of production, u^  ^is the random 
disturbance, and and are the production coefficients. Sub­
stituting the realized price p^  for the price expectation and 
aggregating over all agents gives the model; 
where 
M 
Y_ = Z Y 4 4-
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M 
vt = ("it - Bii (ft - B(?ti:ic_i))) 
1=1 
M M 
®1 " ^  ®il ®2 " / ®i2 i=l 1=1 
This model satisfies the basic assumptions given in Section 2 and 
may be estimated by the instrumental variable techniques described as 
long as the set of instruments chosen is contained in every agent's 
information set. 
I'Jhile the limited information strategy reduces the chances of 
incorrectly specifying the appropriate set of instruments set to be 
used in an analysis, the econometrician is still faced with the 
problem of making a priori judgements about what information agents use. 
The econometrician is faced with two conflicting goals when 
trying to choose a set of variables to use as instruments. First, 
there is the desire to keep the list short so that the assumption that 
they are in fact elements of every agents information set is more 
likely to be satisfied. Second, there is the desire to make the list 
long enough so that the instrumental variable estimates are reasonably 
efficient. 
To illustrate the problem, it is safe to assume that the past 
history of the price being predicted enters the agents information set. 
However, that set of variables may not form a very good set of 
instruments with respect to the other variables in the model. 
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When thinking about stochastic variables that are likely candidates 
as instruments, we are forced to consider the process by which agents 
would actually choose information. The fact that it is possible to 
develop different sized models that describe a particular market, say 
that of broilers, has been discussed. There is a natural progression 
to the development of such models. The simplest specification would 
contain only the supply and demand equations for the broiler market. 
A more complete model would include the behavioral equations that 
describe the determination of the variables (other than boiler price 
and quantity) that enter the broiler supply and demand equations. For 
example, one would include the equations that describe the determination 
of the prices of beef and pork, which are substitutes in the demand for 
broilers. An even more complete model would include equations for the 
variables that enter beef and pork supply and demand. For example, one 
could include the determination of beef inventories or the number of 
cows on farms. 
It seems reasonable that agents, in their search for information 
that gives the greatest explanatory power at the lowest cost would 
follow the same progression. Such logic would seem to be at the heart 
of the argument that the relevant set of information to use is that 
implied by the appropriate econometric model. As has been argued, the 
problem is the determination of the "appropriate econometric model." 
The appropriate model is not that which the econometrician happens to 
choose, but is that which sets the marginal cost of further model 
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development equal to the marginal benefits of Improved forecast 
accuracy. 
While this line of reasoning does not tell us how much Information 
agents actually use, it does give us, in a sense, an ordered list of 
variables that are candidates as valid instruments. The judgements 
that must be made a priori is just how far down the list one should 
go when choosing instruments. 
As a final note, when choosing a set of instruments, any 
deterministic components of the price being predicted should be 
included. Recall that it was necessary to assume that agent's infor­
mation sets contain these factors in order to be able to make 
statistical Inferences. This assumption would not seem to be unreasonable 
as an individual attempting to forecast prices would surely take into 
account factors such as time trends and fixed seasonal shifts. 
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4. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS IN THE BROILER MARKET 
In Chapter 3, full information and limited information methods of 
estimating models containing rational expectations were discussed. It 
was shown that a major advantage of the limited information method was 
that it required fewer assumptions regarding the information that 
economic agents actually use when forming expectations. In this 
chapter, the limited information method of estimation is applied in an 
empirical analysis of the chicken broiler industry. 
The broiler market was chosen for the analysis because the structure 
of the industry suggested a supply model very similar to the type dis­
cussed in Section 3 of Chapter 3. Further, analyses of this market 
which incorporated the rational expectations hypothesis have recently 
been presented by Huntzinger (1979) and by Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982). 
The study by Goodwin and Sheffrin is of particular interest because 
they actually performed a test of the validity of the rational expecta­
tions hypothesis using the full information method described in Section 1 
of Chapter 3. They found that the null hypothesis of rationality could 
not be rejected at the 0.10 significance level. 
This author's analysis suggests that the structure of the broiler 
industry is more complex than had been thought. It appears that produc­
tion decisions made well in advance of the marketing date are based upon 
rational expectations, while those made close to the marketing date are 
not. A possible explanation for this behavior, based upon a dynamic 
model of supply, is presented. 
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4.1 A Description of the Broiler Industry 
A broiler is a young chicken from seven to eight weeks old and 
weighing about three and a half pounds. Broilers account for the 
majority of chicken consumption in the United States, about 95% in 1981. 
The broiler industry has experienced tremendous changes in terms of 
organization and technology over the last forty years, which have 
lead to substantial increases in both the efficiency of broiler 
production and the growth of the industry. In the first part of this 
century broiler production was achieved through the interaction of 
many small, single-service firms scattered across the country. 
Extensive vertical integration has lead to a market structure in which 
firms own, or control through contractural agreements, most of the 
various stages of production and marketing of broilers. This has in­
creased efficiency through the improved coordination of production 
activities and by increasing the availability of capital for growth and 
the adoption of new technology. Further, the majority of production 
(88% in 1978) has shifted to the South Atlantic and South Central states 
because of the comparative advantage those regions enjoy in terms of 
climate, availability of feed, and labor costs. Finally, improved 
technology reflected in hybrid strains of broilers, automated production 
techniques and improved management practices have greatly increased 
production efficiency. 
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There are several, clearly defined stages in the production of a 
broiler. The first stage is the placement of day-old pullets in a 
replacement supply flock. The pullets mature to laying hens in 26 
weeks and are then placed in the hatchery supply flock where they 
remain for 32 to 40 weeks. Eggs from the supply flock are set and 
hatched in 3 weeks. The chicks are grown out to broilers in 7 to 8 
weeks, are processed and then shipped to wholesalers and retailers. 
The time lag between processing and display on retailers shelves is 
from 3 to 7 days. 
The various stages of production of a broiler are generally 
controlled by one firm, commonly called the integrator. The typical 
integrator consists of a hatchery, feed mill, processing plant and a 
management staff. These components are generally located within 25 
miles of each other. The actual grow-out of broilers is rarely 
performed by the integrator. Rather, the grow-out is performed under 
contract on 150 to 300 farms surrounding the integrator. Under a 
typical contract, the integrator provides broiler chicks and feed and 
the grower provides the labor and physical capital (some kind of 
housing) necessary for the grow-out. The contract specifies a fixed 
payment to the grower for each pound of broiler produced, and may run 
for part of a year or for several years. In 1977, 90% of all broiler 
production was performed under contract. It may be noted that the 
growers do not contract for the number of birds they will receive, so 
that production decisions remain in the hands of the integrator. 
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As would be expected, the trend toward integration has reduced 
the number of firms in the broiler industry. In 1977, 16 firms, from 
a total of 169, accounted for 50% of all federally inspected slaughter. 
This level of concentration is not great compared to other industries 
in the United States, and most observers conclude that the industry 
remains quite competitive. The growth of firms has resulted in their 
assuming many of the marketing functions traditionally held by whole­
salers. There is no general auction market for wholesale broilers. 
In 1969 about one-third of the production moved through wholesalers, 
with the remainder moving directly from integrators to retailers and 
retail warehouses. The growth of firms has also lead to product, 
differentiation through processor branding. In 1978 it was estimated that 
40% of broiler production was branded. Average rates of return in the 
industry have been adequate to attract the capital necessary to finance 
growth, but tend to be quite variable from year to year. 
Almost all broilers are marketed fresh. Over the sample 
period (1968-1981), changes in frozen chicken inventories, which 
include broilers, fryers and roasters, averaged less than 0.3% of 
monthly broiler production. About 6% of monthly production is 
processed further to be used in canned goods. The international trade 
in broilers is also quite small. Exports account for about 5% of 
monthly production and imports are almost nonexistent. Thus, most 
broilers are produced domestically, with the product moving immediately 
from producers to retailers to consumers. 
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The exact sources of production costs are of particular interest 
in the construction of an economic model of the broiler industry. 
Table 1 reports the percentage breakdown of costs of broiler production 
in the southeast in 1973 and 1974. While the data are based upon 
incomplete survey, they do give an indication of the relative importance 
of the various factors of production. It is clear that feed is the major 
cost in broiler production. Other important costs arise from chicks, 
grower payments, and labor for processing. These four categories 
accounted for 83% of total broiler production costs. 
Table 1. Costs of production in Southeast region, 1973-1974 
Total broiler production cost per-pound ready-to-cook weight = $0,397 
Fraction break down of costs: 
Source: Various issues of the Poultry and Egg Situation 
4.2 Definition of Variables 
This section contains a list and partial description of the 
variables used in the estimation of the models developed in the following 
sections. A complete description of the sources and units of the 
Feed 
Chick 
Processing (labor) 
Grower payment 
Other plant 
Distribution 
Assembly 
Fixed plant 
Other production 
0.57 
0.10 
0.08 
0.08 
0.05 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
0.02 
1.00 
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variables is given in Appendix 4. The data are measured on a monthly 
basis over the period 1968-1981, giving 168 total observations. This 
beginning point was chosen for the sample because the major industrial 
changes due to vertical integration had occurred by then, all monetary 
variables are deflated by the wholesale price index, except for income 
which is deflated by the implicit GNP price deflator for consumption 
expenditures, 
QBR: Average slaughter of broilers per working day 
QBRD: Broiler slaughter plus changes in inventories 
per working day 
PBR: Wholesale broiler price. 
PFD; Broiler feed price. 
FLK: Hatchery flock size. 
CHK: Number of broiler chicks hatched 
PBF: Wholesale beef price. 
QBF; Beef slaughter plus changes in inventories 
PPK: Wholesale pork price. 
QPK: Pork slaughter plus changes in inventories 
PTK: Wholesale turkey price. 
QTK: Turkey slaughter plus changes in inventories 
INC; Disposable income per capita. 
T: A time trend, takes on the value 1 in January 1968, 
and the value 168 in December 1981. 
2 T : Time squared. 
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S j. : Takes on the value 1 for the i'th month (S^  for January, 
Sg for February, etc.), and the value 0 elsewhere. 
WEKDY: Number of working days in the month. 
All variables were transformed by taking logarithms. This was 
done for two reasons. First, it facilitated tests of the hypothesis 
that broiler slaughter should be standardized by the number of working 
days in each month. Second, studies, by Pope et al. (1980) and by 
Chang (1977) suggest that this is the appropriate form of the data for 
the estimation of the demand equation. It was found that the results 
of the analysis of the supply equation were invariant with respect to 
this transformation. 
The derivation of the measures of the variables feed price, 
broiler slaughter and hatchery flock size merit discussion. 
Broiler feed is almost entirely (90%) composed of corn and soybean 
meal. The basic ration consists of 70% corn and 30% soybean meal. The 
price of broiler feed (PFD) was calculated as the a weighted sum of 
the prices of these factors: 
PFD = (.3/2000)'PBN + (.7/56)-PCN 
where PBN is the average price per ton of soybean meal and PCN is the 
average price per bushel of corn (56 pounds in a bushel). These weights 
were taken from Huntzinger (1979). 
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The measure of broiler production chosen was the number of pounds 
of young chicken slaughtered in federally inspected plants, ready-to-
cook weight. Alternative measures of intended production that have 
been used in previous studies include the number of broiler chicks 
placed with growers and the number of broiler chicks hatched. These 
measures have the advantage of being free of the variation, random and 
intentional, that occurs between the time the chicks are placed and the 
time they are processed. They should more clearly reflect the inte­
grators expectations of future events. However, they suffer the dis­
advantage of being based upon incomplete surveys. It was felt that the 
disadvantages of these alternative measures outweighted the advantages, 
so they were not used. 
The reported slaughter was divided by the exact number of working 
days in the month to arrive at average slaughter per working day. Working 
days were defined to be the number of days in the month minus the number 
of Saturdays and Sundays. This is a rather unusual transformation and 
is discussed in detail in Appendix 3. A test of the null hypothesis that 
the measure of broiler slaughter in the demand equation should be 
normalized by the number of working days in the month resulted"in a 
t-statistic of 1.14 with 149 degrees of freedom so that the null 
hypothesis could not be rejected. 
It is interesting that failing to account for this calendar effect 
introduced a strong negative bias in the computed first order autocorrela­
tion when broiler quantity was the dependent variable in a model. Tests 
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of serial correlation based upon the first order autocorrelation (in 
particular, the Durbin-Wat son statistic) were then also badly biased. 
When the demand model was estimated with broiler quantity, unadjusted 
for the number of working days, as the dependent variable, the 
estimated Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.84. After accounting for the 
number of working days, the estimated Durbin-Watson statistic fell to 
0.71. Because the analysis of the stochastic behavior of residuals is 
often restricted to consideration of first order autocorrelations, such 
biases could result in improper analyses and incorrect statistical 
conclusions. 
The measure of hatchery flock size relevant to the production of 
eggs at time t was taken as the sum of pullets placed in the flock from 
time t-6 to t-13. This variable contains measurement error arising from 
several sources. First, the measure of pullet placements is based 
upon an incomplete survey of integrators. Second, all pullets placed 
do not survive, the productivity of the hens varies over their life 
span, and the hens can be kept for periods longer or shorter than 8 
months depending upon market conditions. 
4.3 Estimation of the Demand Function for Broilers 
The price received by broiler producers for their product is 
determined through the interaction of market supply and demand. 
Estimation of the demand function is important because it yields infor­
mation about the variables that are important determinants of the price 
of broilers. The current values of such variables are natural candidates 
as elements of the information set of an individual attempting to 
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forecast future broiler prices. 
Most broilers move directly from integrators to retailers. 
Because there is no general auction market for broilers, it seems that 
the price the integrator receives is determined through direct 
negotiations between himself and the retailer. The demand for broilers 
by retailers is derived directly from the demand for this commodity by 
consumers. 
While the utility maximizing level of demand for broilers by con­
sumers is dependent upon the prices of all other commodities, numerous 
studies (Paulsen et al. (1976), Huntzinger (1979), Pope et al. (1980), 
Wohlgenant and Hahn (1982), Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982), Chavas (1983), 
Hein (1983), Huang and Haidacher (1983)) have demonstrated that the 
prices of substitute meat products such as beef, pork and turkey are of 
particular importance. Also, meat products are generally considered 
normal goods, so that the level of personal income is an important 
element of consumer demand. The studies based upon monthly or quarterly 
data have demonstrated that the time of year has a major impact upon 
demand, which reaches a peak in the summer and a trough in the winter. 
This may be attributed to Americans' preference for barbequed meats 
during the warm weather months. The studies listed above suggest that 
consumers view broilers to be a good substitute for pork and turkey. In 
general, consumers do not barbeque a lot of pork or turkey, substituting 
broilers instead. Further, major holidays, especially Thanksgiving and 
Christmas, result in a pronounced decrease in demand as consumers prepare 
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traditional meals of turkey and ham. The following demand function for 
broilers by consumer is suggested: 
QBrJ = f (PBR^ ,PBFj.,PPK|.,PTK^ ,INa ,S1-S12,T) , 3.1 
A time trend is included to capture changes in consumer preferences, 
population growth, and other factors. It has been suggested by Paulsen 
et al. (1976) that the consumers have been shifting meat consumption 
away from pork and toward beef and poultry, largely because of health 
concerns regarding fatty meats. 
As discussed by Hein (1980), it seems reasonable to assume that 
retailers engage in simple mark-up pricing of their products. While 
retailers may be viewed as facing a down-ward sloping demand curve for 
their products, they deal in a large number of goods with a very high 
turnover rate so that it may not be profitable to attempt to price 
each good so that marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Assuming 
that changes in retailers costs over the sample period may be repre­
sented by a simple time trend, retailers' demand for broilers will 
then be determined by the same set of variables as given in Model 3.1. 
The demand equation may be estimated with either broiler price or 
quantity as the dependent variable. In models in which prices and 
quantities are determined simultaneously, the decision is somewhat 
arbitrary. All of the studies mentioned above, with the exception of 
Paulsen et al. (1976), have estimated the demand equation with the meat 
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quantity as the dependent variable. Paulsen, however, argues that the 
quantity available for sale in wholesale meat markets (beef, pork, 
turkey, broiler, and lamb) is largely fixed and that prices adjust so 
that the quantity demanded equals the fixed quantity supplied. 
This line of reasoning would seem to be particularly true for the 
broiler industry. The ability of broiler producers to delay or 
accelerate the marketing of the birds is constrained to a few days by 
the biological nature of the industry. Changes in frozen inventories 
are extremely small. Brooks (1979) notes that level of exports are 
generally determined by legal constraints such as quotas and other 
import regulations, and not be current price levels. Thus, considera­
tion of the industrial structure suggests that the total quantity of 
broilers supplied in a given month is fixed, and that prices bear the 
burden of adjusting so that the market is in equilibrium. The ability 
of quantity supplied to change depending upon random fluctuations in 
demand is severely limited, while price flexibility would seem to be 
great. These considerations lead one to believe that the broiler price 
in a given month should be considered endogenous with respect to the 
demand equation, and that quantity supplied is exogenous, and 
uncorrelated with any error in the demand equation. 
The actual model estimated is of the form: 
PBRj. = bg + \ ' QBRDj.+ bg . PBF^  + b^  . PPK^  + b^  • PTK^  
(?) (-) (+) (+) (+) 
12 
+ b. • INa + b, ' T + Z b.^ r S. + 5  t o  1 + 5  1  t  
(+) (+) ^ 
3.2 
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where is a random disturbance and the expected signs of the 
coefficients are in parentheses. The seasonal dummy variables 
are normalized around January. Quantity demanded is to be defined 
to be broiler slaughter adjusted for changes in inventories, divided 
by the number of working days in a month. 
It has been argued that the monthly supply of broilers is 
exogenous in this equation. However, the same line of reasoning 
would imply that the prices of broilers, beef, pork and turkey are all 
determined simultaneously. The question arises as to whether this 
simultaneity should be taken into account in the estimation of the 
demand equation. All of the broiler demand studies mentioned, except 
Paulsen et al. (1976), have assumed that the correlation between beef, pork 
and turkey prices and the error in the demand equation is small enough 
to be safely ignored, and have estimated the equation using ordinary 
least squares. This strategy is valid if the covariance between, say, 
beef prices and the error is small relative to the total variation 
in beef price, so that the resulting bias in the estimate of B2 is 
negligible. This would be that case if, for example, the level of 
beef prices were largely determined by the supply of beef, and only 
incidently by the level of broiler prices. Casual observation of the 
meat industry would suggest that this is indeed the case. 
An empirical investigation of this problem was conducted using 
the methods outlined in Corollary 1.4 of Appendix 2. The set of 
instrumental variables: 
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{C,S2-S12,T,T^ ,INCj.,QBF^ ,QPKJ.,QTKJ.,CHK^ _2,WRKDY^ } 
was used to test the null hypothesis that the set of variables 
{WRKDY,T^ ,CHK,QBR,QBF,QPK,QTK,PBF,PPK,PTK} may be considered 
exogenous with respect to the broiler demand equation. The variable 
WRKDY was included in the set of instruments to allow for the 
possibility that beef, pork and turkey production should also be 
normalized by the number of working days. Under the null hypothesis, 
2 the test statistic is distributed as a X with 6 degrees of freedom. 
The computed-value for the statistic was 8.61, so that the null 
hypothesis is not rejected at the 0.10 level of significance. • • 
The test was also performed with broiler quantity as the 
dependent variable. In that case, the null hypothesis is that the 
set of variables {WRKDY,T^ ,CHK,PBR,QBF,QPK,QTK,PBF,PPK,PTK} may be 
considered exogenous with respect to the broiler demand equation 
(broiler price has been substituted for broiler quantity). The computed 
test statistic was 21.8 so that the null hypothesis is rejected at the 
0.01 level of significance. Excluding broiler price from the list of 
variables which are exogenous under the null hypothesis resulted in a 
2 test statistic of 8.34, distributed as a X with 5 degrees of freedom, 
so that the null hypothesis was not rejected at the 0.10 level 
of significance. These results seem to be in conformity with the 
contention that broiler quantity and the prices of beef, pork and 
turkey can be treated as exogenous with respect to the demand equation, 
and that broiler price is endogenous. 
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An examination of the autocovariances of the residuals from an 
initial estimation of Model 3.2 by ordinary least squares suggested 
that they were generated by a first order autoregressive process. 
The estimated first order autoregressive parameter was 0.65. 
The final estimates of Model 3.2 after correcting for this 
autocorrelation are presented in Table 2. The results are, in 
general, satisfactory. Note in particular the importance of the 
seasonal factors. The coefficients associated with broiler quantity, 
pork and turkey prices all have the expected signs and are statisti­
cally different than zero at the 0.01 level of significance. The beef 
price has the correct sign and is significant at the 0.05 level. Time 
and income have the expected signs but income is not significantly 
different than zero. This is probably due to the high correlation 
between these two variables. 
The implied price elasticities of broiler demand are reported in 
Table 3 and are somewhat higher than those reported in previous 
studies. The own price elasticity for broiler demand reported by 
Pope et al. (1980) was -0.60, by Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) was 
-0.45, by Chavas (1983) was between -0.54 and -0.76, and by Huang and 
Haidacher (1983) was -0.68. 
The elasticities derived from the estimates in Table 2 may be too 
high because quantity demanded is in fact endogenous with respect to 
the demand equation, and its coefficient is biased downward on the 
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Table 2. Ordinary least squares estimates of broiler demand 
equation 1968:1 - 1981:12 
Dependent variable: PER 
Estimated coefficient 
Variable (asymptotic S.E.) Variable 
r: 0.823 
Estimated coefficient 
(asymptotic S.E.) 
Intercept 
QBRD 
PBF 
PPK 
PTK 
INC 
S2 
S3 
0.622 
(0.468) 
-0.881 
(0.112) 
0.152 
(0.0663) 
0.304 
(0.0499) 
0.282 
(0.0534) 
0.0833 
(0.365) 
0.00192 
(0.000826) 
0.0135 
(0.0117) 
0.0442 
(0.0151) 
S4 
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S6 
S7 
88 
S9 
SIO 
Sll 
S12 
0.067 
(0.0173) 
0.0892 
(0.0188) 
0.125' 
(0.0207) 
0.0853 
(0.0183) 
0.093 
(0.0195) 
0.0431 
(0.0177) 
0.00587 
(0.0178) 
-0.124 
(0.0195) 
-0.132 
(0.0158) 
Estimated first order autocorrelation of residuals from initial model 
estimates: 0.648 (0.0590) 
Estimated first order autocorrelation of residuals after serial 
correlation correction; -0.0903 (0.0774) 
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Table 3. Broiler demand elasticities 
Method of 
Estimation 
Ordinary 
Least Squares 
Instrumental 
Variable 
Instrumental 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable PER PER QBRD 
Demand Elasticity 
With Respect to: 
PER 
PEF 
PPK 
PTK 
-1.13 
0.17 
0.34 
0.32 
-0.83 
0.14 
0.24 
0.23 
-0.77 
0.13 
0 . 2 2  
0 .21  
other hand, the elasticities reported elsewhere may be too low because 
of the direct use of broiler price as an independent variable in the 
estimation (as in Pope et al. (1980), Chavas (1983) and Huang and 
Haidacher (1983)) or because of the failure to account for the working 
day effect (as in Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982)). Of course, the 
differences may just be due to sampling varability. 
In order to address these issues the demand equation was 
re-estimated using the list of instrumental variables: 
with both broiler price and quantity demanded as dependent variables. 
The estimated demand elasticities are also reported in Table 3. While 
they are lower than those estimated using ordinary least squares, they 
remain at the high end of the range of results reported in the literature. 
{C,S2-S12,T,T^ ,INC^ ,PBFj.,PPK^ ,PTKJ.,CHKJ._2> 
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4.4 Estimation of the Supply Function for Broilers 
The delivery of a truckload of broilers to a retailer or wholesaler 
requires a sequence of production decisions on the part of the integrator. 
These decisions determine factors such as the size of the hatchery supply 
flock, the number of chicks placed with growers, and the number of 
pounds of broiler to process. The desire is to model the stage of 
production that is most conducive to making inferences about the way 
integrators form expectations of future prices. From the description of 
the physical production process, this would seem to be the stage at 
which the number of chicks placed with growers is determined. 
After the decision to place chicks with the growers is made, the 
integrator has largely committed himself to supply the chosen quantity 
of broilers eight weeks later, and to incur the largest portion of his 
costs. While the integrator retains control over the length of grow-
out, this is usually not altered by more than a few days. Because the 
cost of processing and transportation is small relative to the price, 
any chicks that are grown out will be processed and sold. Most 
processed broilers are sold immediately. 
Before chick placements are actually made, the integrator would 
seem to enjoy great flexibility in making production decisions. The 
size of hatchery supply flock only puts an upper bound on the maximum 
number of chicks that can be hatched, so that the integrator has great 
flexibility on the down side. In times of unexpectedly high production, 
integrators can increase hatchings above "normal" levels by setting 
86 
undersized eggs. The supply flock may be considered part of the fixed 
capital of the industry in the short run. 
It will be assumed that integrators are risk neutral so that 
production decisions are made that maximize the expected net present 
value of profit. While production decisions in the broiler industry 
are actually made on a weekly basis, data limitations require modeling 
supply in terms of months. Given the description of the industry, 
this does not seem an unreasonable basis. Because it takes broiler 
chicks seven to eight weeks to grow-out, be processed and shipped, we 
are interested in production decisions made two time periods (months) 
before the commodity is placed on the market. 
A typical firm's production function may be written: 
QBR^ = f(FLK^_3,CHK^_2,FD^._2,Zp 
where QBR^ is the quantity of broilers produced, FLK^_2 is the size of 
the hatchery supply flock, CHK^_2 is the number of chicks placed with 
growers, and FD^_2 is the quantity of feed supplied with growers. The 
variable accounts for other factors such as labor and energy inputs 
and the level of technology. At time t-2, the main variable inputs are 
CHK^ „ and FD^ Because the cost of chicks is essentially fixed, C—Z L—z 
being sunk in the cost of maintaining the supply flock, the only 
variable cost is that associated with feed. Of course, the birds 
consume feed over the entire production period, so that the quantity 
of broilers produced is dependent not only upon FD^ g but also FD^_^. 
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The production function given is of the correct form if integrators 
supply their growers with all the feed necessary for grow-out at the 
beginning of the production period. It is not clear whether this is 
in fact the case. Some analyses were performed under the assumption 
that integrators make several deliveries to their growers. The 
results were not substantially different than those that follow. 
The integrator chooses the levels of CHK^ „ and FD^ „ to maximize t—Z L—Z 
the expected value of profit, conditional upon information observed at 
time t-2: 
E(nJlj._2) = E[(PBRj.AQBR^ - | 
where PBR^ is the price of broilers, PFD^_2 is the price of feed, and 
2 is the integrator's set of information. Substituting the 
production function into the profit function and maximizing with 
respect to CHK^_2 and FD^ g implies that the optimal levels for these 
decision variables are functions of the conditional price expectation, 
E(PBR^|lj. 2^ » the price of feed, the hatchery flock size and the 
elements of Z^. The production function then implies that the actual 
quantity supplied is a function of those same variables: 
QBR^ = g(E(PBRjl^._2),PFD^_2,FLK^_3,Z^) 
There does exist a futures market for broilers, so that the 
opportunity for speculation on the part of producers arises. However, 
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the number of months for which futures contracts exist is fairly-
limited. Because the producers market their birds every week, it was 
felt that the opportunity was very limited. 
The integrator's supply function may be written in linear form, 
with the expected signs of the coefficients, as: 
QBRt - + bj PFI)^_2 + ^  
(?) (+) (-) (+) 
(4.1) 
+ b, T + b. . 4 5 t 
(+) (-) 
where is a random production disturbance. It is assumed that 
advances in technology, consisting mainly of decreases in broiler 
mortality and increases in labor productivity, are captured by 
2 including the time trends T and T . Of course, these variables will 
also capture the effects of other variables which change slowly, such 
as labor costs. The expected sign on time squared is negative because 
the rate of growth in technological advance has been slowing over the 
sample period. Except for the variable FLK^_^, this is the same 
model as was estimated by Huntzinger (1979) and by Goodwin and 
Sheffrin (1982). 
Substituting the observed market price for the price expectation 
in Model 4.1 gives the estimable model: 
QBRj. = bg + b^PBR^ + b2PFD^_2 + b^FlK^_g + b^T + b^T^ + (4.2) 
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where 
Vt = Ut - b,(PBR^ - E(PBRJIj._2)) . 
Plots of the variables QBR^, PBR^, PFD^, and FLKj. are presented in 
Figures 1 through 8. 
The unobserved error in this model, V^, is composed of both the 
random production disturbance and the integrator's forecasting 
error. 
It will be assumed that the industry supply model is of the same 
form as Model 4.2. The error is then to be interpreted as the 
aggregate of all individual production and forecast errors. In order 
for the estimation and statistical evaluation of the model to proceed 
as described in Chapter 3, it is not necessary that all integrators 
utilize the same information set when forming expectations. As 
discussed in Section 4 of Chapter 3, it is only necessary that they 
share some common core of information. 
Estimation of the supply equation using the methods of Chapter 3 
requires the identification of a set of instruments that possess the 
following three properties; they must be correlated with the 
explanatory variables in the supply equation, they must be elements of 
each integrator's information set, and they must be uncorrelated with 
the production error U^. Of particular interest are instruments 
observed at time t-2 that are useful in explaining the broiler price 
that will prevail at time t. 
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The variables that enter the supply and demand equations describing 
the broiler market will generally satisfy the first requirement of being 
correlated with the future broiler price. Given that broiler producers 
are relatively large and sophisticated concerns, it seems reasonable 
that they would be aware of the importance of the elements of broiler 
supply and demand in the determination of prices, and that they would aiake 
use of at least that much information. 
Recall that the testing procedure developed in Chapter 3 evaluates 
the null hypothesis that the chosen instruments are uncorrelated with the 
composite error . If this hypothesis is rejected, it is not possible 
to determine if it is because the instruments are correlated with the 
production disturbance or because integrators are not forming 
expectations rationally. Because the null hypothesis that the instruments 
are uncorrelated with the production disturbance cannot be tested 
explicitly, they must be chosen with care, especially in light of the fact 
that production disturbances are likely to be serially correlated. 
The most likely element of an integrator's information set, trying 
to forecast the price of broilers at time t based upon information 
available at time t-2, is the actual price of broilers at time t-2. 
This variable would satisfy the stated requirements if the production 
disturbance was not serially correlated. As this is not likely to be 
the case, the price of broilers at time t-2 was not considered to be a 
valid instrument. Because the price of feed and the level of national 
income are determined by many factors outside the general market for 
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meat products, these variables will be considered valid instruments, as 
will fixed factors such as time trends and seasonal dummy variables. 
Whether the prices of beef, pork, and turkey may be considered 
uncorrelated with the disturbance requires more thought. It is 
useful to consider the chain of events that could result in the price 
of, say, pork at time t-2 to be correlated with production error at 
time t, U^. Production errors influence the quantity of broilers 
produced, which influences the price of broilers. Because meat prices 
are determined simultaneously, the price of pork at a given point in 
time is dependent upon the current price of broilers. The price of 
pork at time t-2 is therefore dependent upon the random broiler 
production disturbance, 2' the production errors are serially 
correlated, then it will be the case that PPK^ ^ will be correlated 
with U^. At each link in this chain of events, the contribution of 
the error to variation in PPK^_2 is weakened. It will be assumed 
that it is, in fact, weakened enough so that the pork price, is a 
valid instrument. It may be recalled that the prices of these sub­
stitute meats were found to be exogenous with respect to the error 
in demand equation. 
The final list of instruments chosen for the estimation of Model 
4.2 were: 
P™t-2.™t-12'™Ct.2'I''Ct-12' 
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The prices of beef, pork, turkey, feed and the level of income all 
lagged 12 periods were included to use as instruments for the measure 
of flock- size, which may be expected to contain error. 
The first step in the analysis is the estimation of Model 4.2 by 
two stage least squares, using the list of instruments given above. 
The second step in the estimation of the model is the transforma­
tion of the data to correct for serial correlation in the error. 
Because the production process takes two time periods, the observed 
disturbance at time t may be related to conditions that exist at both 
time t-1 and time t-2. Consequently, one may expect the production 
disturbance to be represented by a second order autoregressive 
process. Because the producer's forecast horizon is two periods long, 
one would expect their forecast error to represented by a first order 
moving average process. As discussed in Chapter 3, the composite error 
Vj. should have a representation as an autoregressive moving average 
process of order (2,3). 
The estimated autocorrelations of the residuals from the initial 
regression computed to lag 37 is presented in Figure 9. Because the 
autocorrelations do not die out at large lags, it appears that the 
residuals do not form a stationary time series. In fact, it is clear 
that there is a regular pattern to the autocorrelations which is 
repeated every 12 lags. It seems to this author that there is a 
fixed seasonal component in the residuals. 
A possible reason for this fixed seasonal effect in the residuals 
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Figure 9. Autocorrelations of residuals from supply equation 
estimated without seasonal dummy variables 
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is that producers are not properly anticipating seasonal shifts in 
demand. The forecast error component of the composite error would 
then contain a fixed seasonal effect. This would be a disturbing 
conclusion as one would expect them to be aware of the deterministic 
components of demand if nothing else. 
Another possible source of seasonal variation are seasonal shifts 
in the production function. It has been common in previous studies of 
the broiler market (O'Mara (1970), Paulsen et al. (1976), Gellatly (1979), 
Chavas and Johnson (1982)) to include seasonal dummy variables in the 
supply equation, with the justification that the productivity of 
broilers (especially feed conversion rates and chick mortality) is 
dependent upon the time of the year. Fixed seasonal affects were not 
initially included in the supply equation because it was felt that the 
adoption of environmentally controlled housing had eliminated these 
influences. However, given the behavior of the residuals, it was 
decided to re-estimate the supply equation with the inclusion of a set 
of seasonal dummy variables. 
An examination of autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations 
from the initial estimation of the supply equation, including seasonal 
dummy variables, suggested that the residuals were being generated by 
a first order autoregressive process. The seasonal component in the 
residuals was eliminated. The lack of an apparent moving average term 
is a little disturbing as theory suggests that the residuals should 
contain a moving average component generated by the difference between 
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the actual broiler price and integrators expectations. However, it is 
possible that the moving average component is negligible if integrators 
forecast errors are small relative to the random production disturbance. 
This is not unreasonable given that integrators are forecasting over a 
fairly short time horizon (two months). 
The variables in Model 4.2, plus a set of seasonal dummy variables, 
were transformed in a "forward" manner, on the basis of a first order 
autoregressive model fit to the initial residuals. The estimated 
coefficient of the autoregressive model was 0.70. Re-estimation of 
the model by instrumental variables gave the results presented in 
Table 4, which are quite disappointing. Many of the seasonal dummy 
variables and the time trend are highly significant. Feed price is 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level and flock size is significant 
at the 0.01 level. However, broiler price, which is the variable of 
real interest in the examination of how expectations are formed, is not 
statistically different than zero at any reasonable level of significance. 
The failure of broiler price to contribute to the regression suggests 
that expectations are not being formed rationally, and it did not seem 
appropriate to pursue the test of rationality further using this particular 
model specification. 
Conversations with various agricultural extension agents provided 
some insights into a possible source of model misspecification. The 
general consensus was that many major broiler production decisions are 
made from one to two years prior to marketing. One is led to 
consider the possibility that there is not a fixed point in time at 
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Table 4. Instrumental variable estimates of broiler supply equation 
with rational expectations 
Dependent variable: QBR 
Variable 
Estimated coefficients 
(asymptotic S.E.) Variable 
* ; 0.910 
Estimated coefficients 
(asymptotic S.E.) 
Intercept 0.706 
(0.103) 
S5 0.0574 
(0.0126) 
PER 0.0303 
(0.0966) 
S6 0.0881 
(0.0139) 
PFD -0.0918 
(0.0510) 
S7 0.0225 
(0.0154) 
FLK 0.349 
(0.128) 
S8 0.0770 
(0.0131) 
0.00641 
(0.000971) 
89 0.0457 
(0.0120) 
-0.0000134 
(0.00000537) 
SIO 0.0748 
(0.0134) 
82 -0.0271 
(0.00817) 
Sll -0.0693 
(0.0130) 
S3 -0.00640 
(0.0107) 
S12 -0.0589 
(0.0111) 
84 0.0281 
(0.0117) 
Estimated first order autocorrelations of residuals from initial model 
estimate: 0.709 (0.0546) 
Estimated first order autocorrelations of residuals after serial 
correlation correction: -0.110 (0.0776) 
a 9 
R = 1 - (8SE/SST) . 
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which production decisions are made, but that integrators make a 
sequence of decisions, over a span of perhaps two years, that 
culminate in the final level of supply. 
It is not difficult to modify the model to account for such 
dynamic behavior. Define EQ^_^ to be the quantity producers expect 
(plan) to supply at time t, with the expectation formed at time t-i. 
Assume that producers begin planning production at time t-A, and that 
they update their plans in each period according to new information 
about the price they expect to receive at time t. Assume that 
changing the level of planned production from period to period is a 
costly activity, and that these costs are quadratic in nature. The 
firm's profit function may be written: 
2 2 
"t = Pt^t " - (C/2) Z 
j-1 
B > 0, C > 0 
QT = SQT-I + %T 
Where is a random production disturbance and it is assumed that 
the final production decisions are made one period prior to marketing. 
At each point in time from t-A to t-1, the firms chooses the level of 
planned production that maximizes expected future profit, conditional 
upon current information. The profit maximizing level of production 
is then a distributed lag of price expectations formed at time t-A 
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through t-1: 
A 
(4.3) 
where 
= (C/(B + C))^"^(1/(B + O) 1=1,2 A-1 
= (C/(B +C))A ^(1/B) i=A 
The broiler supply equation may be expressed in the form of Model 
4.3, with a production lag of two periods and with the error in the 
model being composed of the production disturbance and a distributed 
lag of the forecast errors arising from the predictions of broiler and 
feed prices formed in the time period t-A through t-2. If A is greater 
than 2, then using the information available at time t-2 as instruments 
in the estimation of the supply equation will result in biased 
parameter estimates, even if expectations are being formed rationally. 
However, if the set of instruments are chosen at time t-A, then 
consistent parameter estimates will be obtained. 
In order to investigate the possibility that this is the correct 
model, the supply equation was re-estimated with the instruments 
chosen at points in time t-3, t-4, t-5, and t-6. The estimated 
coefficients on broiler price, feed price and flock size for each of 
these models are presented in Table 5. Broiler price does not become 
statistically significant in any of the models, and has the wrong sign 
when the instruments are chosen at time t-6. 
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Table 5. Estimated supply coefficients with instruments chosen at 
varying lag lengths 
Dependent variable: QBR 
Estimated coefficients 
(asymptotic S.E.) 
with instrument lags of 
Variable^ t-3 t-4 t-5 t-6 
PER • 0.0816 0.177 0.125 -0.028 
(0.116) (0.135) (0.135) (0.121) 
PFD -0.0931 -0.0852 -0.0239 -0.0352 
(0.0527) (0.0545 (0.0615) (0.0630) 
FLK 0.289 0.495 0.462 0.293 
(0,130) (0.151) (0.149) (0.129) 
a Other supply variables have been suppressed . 
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Given the apparent failure of the rational expectations model to 
explain producer behavior, it was decided to re-estimate the supply 
equation in a more conventional framework, that of a cobweb-type 
model. Assume that flock size is indeed a measure of production 
decisions made nine months prior to marketing. Consider the 
production decisions made in the subsequent 7 months, and suppose that 
integrators make these decisions on the basis of current, rather than 
expected future, profitability. It would then be the case that 
broiler supply would a function of a distributed lag of broiler prices 
and feed costs observed at times t-8 to t-2. As always the problem 
associated with such a model is the specification of the appropriate 
lag structure. Define the variable PBRLAG^ as the simple average of 
broiler prices from time t-8 to t-2, PFDLAG^. as the average of feed 
prices from time t-10 to t-4: 
8 
PBRLAG^ = (1/7) I PBR . 
t i=2 
10 
PFDLAG^ = (1/7) S PFD^ . 
i=4 
and let the supply model be given by: 
QBR^ = bg + b^PBRLAG^ + b^PFDLAG^ + b^FLK^_^ + b^T + b^T^ 
(4.4) 
x=2 
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This equation was estimated by instrumental variables, after 
correcting for second order autocorrelation in the usual manner, using 
the set of instruments: 
{C, S2-S12,T,T^,PFDLAGj.,PBF^_5,PBF^_^ ,PPK^_3 ,PPK^_5 ,PPK^_y, 
PTK , _ 3 ,PTK ^ _ 5 ,PTKJ ^ _ 7 ,INC ^ _ 5 }  
transformed according to the second order autoregressive process 
describing the residuals from the supply equation. Only one lagged 
value of income was included in order to conserve on the number of 
instrumental variables. It may be recalled that income was not found 
to be an important determinant of broiler price in the estimation of 
the broiler demand equation. The estimated coefficients of autore­
gressive model were 0.43 and 0.20. The estimates of the cobweb 
supply model are presented in Table 6, and are substantially better 
than those generated by the rational expectations model. The 
coefficients associated with the variables PBKLAG^ and PFDLAG^ are 
both of the correct sign and are highly significant. Flock size 
remains significant at the 0.01 level. 
In order to investigate the possibility of different lag structures, 
the model was also estimated with a polynomial distributed lag of 
broiler and feed prices of order 1. The implied form of the lag 
seemed to be quite sensitive to minor changes in lag length and set 
of instrumental variables, so that it was decided to remain with the 
specification given. 
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Table 6. Instrumental variable estimates of broiler supply equation 
with cobweb expectations 
Dependent variable: QBR 
Estimated coefficient 
Variable (asymptotic S.E.) Variable 
r : 0.937 
Estimated coefficient 
(asymptotic S.E.) 
Intercept 
PBRLAG 
PFDLAG 
FLK 
S2 
S3 
S4 
0.794 
(0.115) 
0.416 
(0.0791) 
-0.183 
(0.0427) 
0.363 
(0.133) 
0.00643 
(0.000968) 
-0.00000722 
(0.00000561) 
-0.0260 
(0.00754) 
-0.00312 
(0.00878) 
0.0348 
(0.00970) 
S5 
S6 
S7 
S8 
S9 
SIO 
Sll 
S12 
0.0665 
(0.0101) 
0.0991 
(0.0106) 
0.0289 
(0.0104) 
0.0735 
(0.00982) 
0.0349 
(0.00963) 
0.0629 
(0.0100) 
-0.0782 
(0.00976) 
-0.0638 
(0.00809) 
Estimated autocorrelations of residuals from initial model estimate -
First order: 0.434 (0.0762) Second order: 0.204 (0.0754) 
Estimated autocorrelations of residuals after serial correlation correc­
tion - First order: 0.00670 (0.0782) Second order: 0.0229 (0.0776) 
R = 1 - (SSE/SST) . 
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The implication of these analyses is that short run production 
decisions are better explained by a cobweb model than by a rational 
expectations model. One may be tempted to argue that expectations are 
being formed rationally but that the variable PBRLAGj., from the cobweb 
model, is a better measure of the distributed lag of price expectations 
than is the actual price PBR^. This is not the case as the way in 
which PBRLAG^ is constructed does not make it an optimal forecast of 
the future price. It is important to keep in mind when comparing these 
models that the same basic set of instruments have been used in the 
estimation. 
While short run production decisions do not seem to be based upon 
expectations that are formed rationally, the data suggest that long 
run production decisions are. In particular, a cursory examination of 
the estimated seasonal component of supply indicates that it is 
closely linked to the seasonal component of demand. Plots of the 
seasonal coefficients from the supply and demand equations are 
presented in Figures 10 and 11. They appear to follow the same general 
pattern. Discussions with extension agents and a reading of USDA 
literature concerning the broiler industry both confirm the fact that 
most of the seasonal variation in broiler supply stems from expected 
seasonal changes in demand and not from seasonal shifts in the firms' 
production functions. 
There are some differences in the patterns of the seasonal 
coefficients presented in Figures 10 and 11, but this is to be expected. 
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Figure 11. Seasonal dummy coefficients from broiler supply equation 
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On the demand side of the market, some of the shifts in the demand 
function are due to seasonal variations in the prices of beef, pork 
and turkey. Those influences will be captured by the variables 
PBFj., PPK^, and PTK^ and not by the seasonal dummy variables in the 
demand equation. On the supply side, the variables PBRLAG^ and 
PFDLAG^ will contain seasonal components that one does not really 
expect to effect production decisions. The measure of flock size 
also contains a seasonal measurement error as producers tend to vary 
the length of time they keep hens in the flock according to the time 
of the year. The seasonal dummy variables in the supply equation will 
capture the effects of these measurement errors, resulting in biased 
parameter estimates. Even with environmentally controlled housing, 
there are seasonal shifts in the supply function as the cost of main­
taining desirable growing conditions varies over the year, which will 
be reflected in the estimates of the seasonal coefficients. 
If it is in fact the case that producers are anticipating seasonal 
shifts in the demand function, and plan production accordingly, then 
that component of supply is based upon rational expectations. Some 
analyses were performed in an attempt to decompose the seasonal varia­
tion in supply into the components that were demand related and those 
that were not. The author did not feel the results were reliable due 
to the complexity of the model necessary to account for all the factors 
discussed in the preceding paragraph. 
The interesting question is why broiler producers would behave in 
a manner that includes elements of both cobweb and rational expectations 
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models. One possible explanation is the following. If broiler producers 
are making their initial production plans one or two years prior to 
marketing, then the stochastic components of price will converge to trend 
lines, while deterministic components such as seasonality will be un-
dampened. Consequently, one would expect initial production plans to be 
dominated by the seasonal component in price. In the rational distributed 
lag model of production given in 4.3, it is easy to see that as the cost 
of adjusting planned production increases, the influence of initial 
production plans on actual production also increases and the ability of 
producers to respond to new information eventually decreases. Conse­
quently, if there are substantial costs of adjustment, one would expect 
supply to be dominated by seasonal factors. Furthermore, recall from Chap­
ter 3 that the value of information to a firm is highly dependent upon the 
ability of the producer to respond to the resulting price forecasts. 
With large adjustment costs, the value of new information becomes small 
and the optimal strategy for the producer may be to adopt the very simple 
and inexpensive cobweb expectation rule in the short run. 
A sequential fitting of the cobweb model defined in 4.4 using 
instrumental variables gave the following results. After accounting 
for the quadratic time trend, 81% of the variation in broiler slaughter 
may be explained by the seasonal dummy variables and flock size, and 
84% by those variables plus PBRLAG^ and PFDLAG^.. In this model, it is 
indeed the case that relatively small adjustments are made in production 
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in the nine months prior to marketing. It may be noted that excluding 
PBRLAG^  and PFDLAG^  from the model had a relatively small impact on the 
estimated coefficients associated with the seasonal dummy variables 
and flock size. For example, the estimated elasticity of supply with 
respect to flock size changed from 0.36 to 0.32. 
These arguments all hinge on the presence of substantial costs 
of adjustment in planned production. One source of such costs is in 
the relationship of the integrators with their growers. Recall that a 
specific integrator is restricted to deal with a group of growers 
within a specific geographic boundry, and conversely. Consequently, 
the integrator must realize that his group of growers is solely dependent 
upon him for their economic survival. Large deviations in planned 
production on the downward side may be very costly to the integrator if 
they result in the loss of growers. 
Another source of adjustment costs arises from the marketing of 
the birds. Because most broilers are marketed as fresh they must move 
very quickly from the integrator to the wholesaler to the retailer and 
finally to the consumer. Because there is no general auction market 
for broilers and because integrators harvest a new flock of birds 
every week, he is faced with the problem of finding an immediate buyer 
for his product every week. It has been suggested that the costs 
associated with locating buyers can be substantial, and that many 
integrators enter informal agreements regarding supply with particular 
wholesalers and retailers. Large short run changes in production 
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would mean either the breaking of such agreements, or the location of 
new buyers, both of which are costly activities. 
The argument that has been presented is that broiler producers 
may not form expectations rationally when making short run production 
decisions because the cost of that activity outweighs the benefits. 
It is suggested that the benefits of expectation formation are relatively 
small because of the inability of the producers to change production 
levels from those previously planned. The dependency of the value of 
information on the ability to adjust production was demonstrated in 
Chapter 2. There may appear to be some inconsistency in this chain of 
reasoning because the analysis presented in Chapter 2 deals with the 
quantity of information in agent would use, given the assumption that 
the chosen set of information would be used rationally. However, that 
is the assumption that is being questioned here. 
The pertinent section of Chapter 2 is easily modified to encompass 
the issue under discussion. An implicit assumption in Chapter 2 is 
that the actual construction of the expectation, given a set of informa­
tion, is costless. If this is in fact the case, then all agents may be 
assumed to form expectations rationally because that is the most 
efficient use of the data. If, however, both information collection 
and expectation formation are costly activities, which is likely, then 
the typical agent is faced with two decisions. These are how much 
information to use and how to make use of the chosen set of information. 
The Value Function 1.1 derived in Chapter 2 should then be viewed as 
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giving the worth of the rational expectation based upon a particular set 
of information. Consequently, the value of forming expectations 
rationally is effected by the parameters of the production function 
is the same as was the value of information, given the assumption of 
rationality. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, an analysis of expectation formation by economic 
agents has been presented. The central concept in the work is that 
expectation formation is an activity that involves both costs and 
benefits. Consequently, standard methods of economic analysis may be 
used to describe how individuals make decisions regarding the con­
struction of expectations. The results of the study are summarized 
below. 
A theoretical analysis of the value of information to a firm 
operating in a productive environment is presented in Chapter 2. 
The firm's production process takes time so that production decisions 
must be made without knowledge of the actual price it will receive for 
its product. Production decisions are then based upon expectations of 
the future price. Prices vary because exogenous factors shift the 
market demand function. It is assumed that the firm is risk neutral 
and forms expectations as stochastic conditional expectations. The 
firm's price expectation is then a function of the expected value of 
the exogenous factors. The parameters of the function are determined 
by the parameters describing the market supply and demand functions. 
It is shown that the value of information is directly related to 
the amount of variation in prices that may be explained by the informa­
tion. The magnitude of the forecast errors are unimportant. The value 
of information is directly related to the ability of the firm to 
respond to changes in the expected price. The value of information is 
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inversely related to the elasticity of the market demand function. 
This is because prices become more volatile as the demand elasticity 
decreases. 
The effects on the value of information when firms differ in the 
amount of information used to form expectations is discussed. 
Public information is assumed to be available to all firms at no cost, 
whereas private information is costly. When all information is 
assumed to be exogenous, the value of private information decreases 
as more firms make use of it. The value of public information is 
unaffected. The number of firms which acquire private information is 
such that the marginal cost of that activity equals the marginal 
benefits. This number is found to maximize expected social welfare. 
The special case in which public information consists of the past 
history of price is considered. In this case, public information is 
endogeneous. As more firms make use of private information its value 
falls, as before, but the value of public information actually increases. 
The free market is found to underutilize private information, in terms 
of maximizing social welfare. It is interesting that these are the 
same qualitative conclusions that have been reached by others in the 
analysis of value of information in speculative markets. 
In Chapter 3, methods of estimating econometric models containing 
expectations are discussed. The fundamental problem to be overcome is 
that expectations are not explicitly observable. It is demonstrated that 
the actual market price may be used as a measure with error of the 
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price expectation. The model may then be estimated using instrumental 
variable techniques, where the instruments are assumed to be elements 
of the set of information used by agents to form their expecations. 
This eliminates the need for the assumption that agents use all 
available information when forming expectations, which is the basis 
for many tests of rationality. Special consideration must be given to 
the error term in the model. I'Then the sampling interval is shorter than 
the forecast horizon, the methodology may be expected to introduce a 
moving average component into the error. Proper correction for this 
autocorrelation requires that the data be transformed in a forward 
rather than the usual backward manner. A test of the assumption of 
rationality may be constructed as the standard test of over-identifying 
restrictions. 
In Chapter 4, an empirical examination of expectation formation in 
the broiler market is presented. This particular market was chosen 
for the analysis because prior studies had suggested that expectations 
in the broiler industry were formed rationally. Unfortunately, measures 
of broiler production were determined to contain substantial measurement 
error which caused the previously published work to be badly biased. 
After correcting for the measurement error, little support for the 
assumption of rationality was found. However, a cobweb model of 
expectation formation performs very well in explaining producer behavior. 
A possible explanation of these results is that the ability of producers 
to adjust production substantially in the short run is very limited, so 
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that the value of forming expectations rationally is very small. It is 
shown that most production decisions in the broiler industry are in fact 
made well in advance of the marketing date. 
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8. APPENDIX A 
Let be the time series defined by 
t^ = ^ t + ^t + ®t-l' 1^ 1 < 1 and ng > 0 , 
2 
where the e^  form a sequence of independent (0,a ) random variables. In 
order to prove the claims made in Chapter 2, it is necessary to derive 
several properties describing the behavior of Y^ . Without loss of 
generality, assume that Var(e^ ) = 1. For simplicity, define the constant 
Y as 
b Y = 
l+n^  
so that I Y I < 1 by assumption. Let 
Var(U^ ) = D . 
The covariance function of Y^  is given by 
D + 1 + Y ^ , h = 0  
Cov(Y^ , Y^ _^ ) / Y , h = 1 
, h = 2,3,... 
Now, Y^  has a zero mean and a first autocorrelation for which the 
absolute value is bounded above by .5. By Fuller (1976, p. 62), it 
follows that Yj. has a representation as a first order moving average 
process 
Yt = ft + cft-1 ' Ic| < 1 ' 
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where f^  form a sequence of uncorrelated random variables with zero mean 
and constant variance, Var(f^ ) = A. The constants c and A must satisfy 
both 
(1 + c^ ) A = D + 1 + (1) 
and 
cA = Y • (2)  
These constants have the following properties. 
Property 1. c y > 0 . 
Proof : Follows directly from Equation 2. 
Property 2. |c| < |Y| • 
Proof; From Equations 1 and 2. 
1+c^  _ D + 1+Y^  
c Y 
2 2 
, . , . 1. 1+c  ^ 1+Y 
which implies -i—i— > —t—r . |c IYI 
The result follows from Property 1 and by noting that f(x) = 
is a decreasing function of x. 
Property 3. < 0 . 
Proof : 
dA  ^dY dA 
dn^  dng dY 
1+x 2 
132 
and 
dY _ -b _ -Y 
"^2 (l+n^ )^  (l+n^ )^  
Differentiate Equations 1 and 2 with respect to A and c. 
(l+c^ )dA + (2Ac)dc = (2y)dY (4) 
(c)dA + (A)do = dy (5) 
These equations may be reduced to 
dA _ 2(y-c) 
dY - l_c2 
The result follows from Properties 1 and 2, 
Property 4. c dc , ^ 
dn^  
Proof ; dc _ dy dc 
dn^  dn^  dy ' 
dY 
where is defined in Equation 3. 
Reducing Equations 4 and 5 yields 
2 dc _ -2yc + 1 + c 
A(l-c^ ) 
. 1 - + « > 
A(1 - c^ ) 
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Then, 
c dc_ ^  ( C Y) (1 - + D) < 0  
"^2 (1+n^ ) A(l-c^ ) 
Now, EXl^  is defined as 
EXl^  = (1 + ng) cf^ _^  . 
Therefore, 
Var(EXlj.) = 0^  ^= (l+n2)c^ A 
2 
= —2 c A 
Y 
= ^ 
A ' 
Differentiating with respect to 1X2 yields 
• -b^  _dA > 0 
dUg 2^ dng 
Since v(Il) = —» , it follows that 
2(1+N) 
^^>0 . 
dng 
Next, we will verify that 
dv(l2|ll) ^  Q 
dn^  
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Consider 
Then, 
and 
a = A - 1 - D 
w 
dA 
dn^  dn^  < 0 
The result follows by recalling 
v(I2|ll) = j 
Finally, consider the first order condition defining the equilibrium 
number of firms using private information, where public information is 
endogenous. It is 
1 
2 
(N-ng) 
(l+N)(l+n„) dn„ 
= c ( 6 )  
The first order condition for the maximization of social welfare is 
(7) 
Because every term in Equation 6 is positive, it follows that the left 
hand side of Equation 5 is greater than the left hand side of Equation 
7. Now, 
135 
dn„ 
< 0 
and 
d 
dn. 
(N-ng) 
(1+N)(l+ng) < 0 
Further, 
(dng) I 
d -b^  
-Y 2(Y-c) 
dn. [ A M (l+rig) [ l-c^ J 
d 
DUN (l+Hg) 
2(Y-c) 
< 0 , 
d 
dn^  
be 2(y-c) 
( L - C ^ )  
< 0 , 
Since 
dn (l-c^ ) > 0 , 
d(c^ ) 
DUN 
< 0 , 
and 
dn. (b(Y-c)) < 0 
Consequently, as ng increases, the left hand side of Equation 6 decreases 
and approaches the socially optimal level. This also shows that n^  is the 
level of private information usage that maximizes social welfare. 
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9. APPENDIX B 
Consider the model 
y = xe + u , (1) 
where y is an nxl vector, X is an nxK matrix, g is a Kxl vector and u is 
an nxl vector. The vector y and the matrix X are observed, the vector u 
is an error terra composed of unobserved random variables with zero mean, 
and the elements of 3 are to be estimated. 
In some cases, the elements of X will be correlated with the elements 
of u. T^ Jhen this occurs, ordinary least squares estimates of 3 can be 
badly biased. Consistent estimates of 3 may be obtained if it is 
possible to identify a set of variables that are correlated with those 
that enter the matrix X and are not correlated with the error u. Such 
variables are known as instrumental variables. Let Z be the nxK 
(K>G) matrix of observations of the instrumental variables. The instru­
mental variable estimator of 6 is then given by 
6 = (X'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'X)"^ X'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'Y (2) 
The asymptotic properties of instrumental variable estimators have 
been proved many times. However, it is useful to derive them explicitly 
so that the results may be used, in the work that follows. 
It is assumed that the elements of X may contain both fixed and 
random components, but that the elements of Z are all fixed functions 
of time, independent of u. 
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Define; 
1/2 
Ini Z Z i=l ti 
i = 1,2 K 
n 
1/2 
2nl E Z X 
1=1 
ti i — 1,2,..,,G 
°ln l^n2' ' ' ^InK^  ' 
°2n 2^n2' 2^nG^  
Assume: 
1) 
11m d„ . = «> 
X — 1,2,«..,K 
i = 1,2,...,G 
2) The matrices (Z'Z) and (X'Z(Z'Z) ^ Z'X) are nonsingular for 
all n > K . 
3) The matrices M , M , and (M M ^  M ) exist and are 
zz' XX xz zz zx 
nonsingular where, 
11. D;;(z'z)D;i . , 
n-x» 
pli» D;:(x'x)D;^  - , 
and 
pita D-;;(X'Z)D-^  - . 
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4) m = 0 , i = 1,2 k 
and 
"^ Ini^ Znj j.f^ t^i^ t+h-j " Chlj = c-hij ' h = 0,1,2, 
p q 
5 )  ^ t - l ^ i  ~  ^  ^ t — t  =  0 ,  + 1 ,  + 2 ,  . . .  
1=0  ^ j=l c J ] 
where a^  = = 1, the roots of the polynomials 
+ a-M^ "^  + aX~^  + ... + a =0 12 p 
and 
+ b.M^ 'Z + ... + b = 0 
12 q 
are less then one in absolute value, and e^  is a sequence of 
independent (0, a^ ) random variables with E(e^ ) < °° . 
Theorem 1: Let Model (1) hold and define g as in Equation (2). Given 
Assumptions (l)-(5), then 
• («X: "li Ki ""'A + "p (» • 
Proof ; Now, 
B = (X'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'X)~^ X'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'y 
= 6 + (X'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'X)~^ X'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'u 
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therefore. 
Consider the stochastic behavior of the (Kxl) vector D^ Z^'u. We have 
E(Dr^ Z'u) = 0 
Xn 
and 
E(D-l(Z'uu'Z)Dj^ )-l - On 
The (i,j)th element of is 
"^ Ini "^ Inj 
where 
Now, 
Y^ (h) = E(u^  u^ _h) . 
lim Q = Q 
n-x»  ^
where the (i,j)th element of Q is 
'« h.L V-' 
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which is finite because the sequence Y^ (h) is absolutely summable. 
Consequently, 
D-^ Z'u . Op(l) . 
By assumption. 
- «ZZ + °(» 
and 
+ °p(l) 
SO that. 
- [«xz 'C + °p(» • N  
Tests of hypothesis concerning the elements of B are easily con­
structed when u^  forms a sequence of independent random variables. 
Let us assume: 
6) a^  = bj = 0 for i = 1,2,...,p , 
and j = l,2,...,q , 
where a^  and b^  are defined in Assumption (5). 
The following corollary gives the limiting distribution of the 
instrumental variable estimators of B. 
Corollary 1.1 Let Model (1) and Assumption (l)-(6) hold. 
Then, 
141 
where 3 is defined by Equation (2). 
Proof : Assumptions (1), (4), (5), and (6) satisfy the condition of 
Theorem 6.3.4 in Fuller (p.251, 1976). Therefore, 
DT^ Z'u = CL^ Z'e —> N(0, M ah • 
In In zz 
The limiting distribution of is the same as the limiting 
distribution of 
hence the result. Q 
Given the assumptions of Corollary 1.1, it is possible to perform 
tests of hypotheses concerning the elements of 6. In practice, the 
variance-covariance matrix of (3-3) will be estimated by 
(Z'Z(Z'Z)~^ Z'X)"^ S^  , 
2 2 
where S is a consistent estimate of o 
2 It follows from Corollary 1.5 that a may be consistently estimated 
using the vector of residuals generated by the instrumental variable 
estimator. 
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One may also be interested in testing the hypotheses that the 
elements of Z and/or X are independent of the error e^ . The following 
three corollaries deal with such tests. It is useful to define several 
additional matrices. 
Let W be the Nx(G+K) matrix of explanatory variables in the model, 
and let V be the NxG matrix of residuals from the regression of X on Z. 
Therefore, 
W = [X Z] 
and 
V = X - Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'X . 
Note that by Assumption (3), 
where 
Define 
and 
M  = M  - M  
W XX xz zz zx 
= X(X'X)"^ X' , 
Pg = Z(Z'Z)"^ Z' , 
P = W(W'W)"^ W' , 
w 
p = v(v'v) 
V 
Make the following additional assumptions. 
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7) Let pllm D~^ X'XD"^  = M 2n 2n XX 
and assume the matrices (W'W), (X'X), and are nonsingular. 
Note that if (W'W) is nonsingular, then Z and X have no 
columns in common. 
First, consider the hypothesis that the elements of Z are 
independent of e^ . Recall that this assumption is necessary in order 
for the instrumental variable estimators to be consistent. A natural 
way to test this hypothesis would be to examine the k dimensional 
vector of covariances between the columns of z and the vector e. The 
difficulty with this approach is that the vector e is not observable. 
However, an estimate of e is available. This is the vector of residuals 
generated by the instrumental variable estimation. 
The following corollary gives the limiting distribution of a test 
statistic based on this strategy and under the assumption of the null 
hypothesis that elements of z are independent of e^ . 
Corollary 1.2 Let Model (1) and Assumptions (1) through (6) hold. 
Then, 
Ca^ ) xte > 
where e = Y - X3 and 3 is defined by Equation (2). 
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Proof: Let 0 = Z'e 
= [Z' - Z'X(X'P^ X)"^ X'P^ ]e . 
Then, 
ê . [I - + o/l) . 
Now, assuming that Z is independent of e , 
D7^ Z'e —> N(0, M a^ ) . 
In zz 
So that, 
0 N(0, G^ ) 
where 
"Iz "zx>"\z • 
It is easily verified that is a singular matrix with rank K-G. 
-1 * Now, Çg is a symmetric idempotent matrix with rank K-G. It follows 
from Searle (1971, p. 69) that 
-O xL • 
The result follows since 
e'P e = 0'D~\l"^ "^ 0 + o (1) . ]] 
z In zz In p 
The test statistic has K-G degrees of freedom because the vector e 
is orthogonal to G linear combinations of the instrumental variables. 
This test statistic is the instrumental variable analog to the test for 
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overidentlfying restrictions which was developed by Anderson and Rubin 
(1956) and by Basmann (1960a). 
One may also wish to test the null hypothesis that the elements of 
X are independent of e^ . If this hypothesis is true, then it is 
permissible to use ordinary least squares to estimate the parameters 
of Model (1). A test statistic for this hypothesis is developed by 
considering the G dimensional vector of covariances between the columns 
of X and the vector e. Corollary 1.3 gives the limiting distribution of 
such a statistic under the null hypothesis that X is independent of e, 
conditional upon a particular realization of X. It is assumed that Z 
is independent of e. 
Corollary 1.3 Let Model (1) and Assumption (1) through (7) hold. Then, 
(ah ^ (e'(PW - PZ - PX)e) —> Xg , 
where e = y - X$ and 6 is defined by Equation (2). 
Proof ; Let ^  = X e 
= [X' - X'X(X'P^ X)~^ X'P^ ]e . 
Then, 
- «xxO'xz C + V »  •  
If X and Z are independent of e, then conditional upon a particular 
relization of the variables entering those matrices. 
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and 
i> K(0, 
D.^ Z'e —> N(0, M a^ ) . 
In zz 
Consequently, 
°2n^  —> N(0, 
where 
By assumption is full rank, and 
= 
W XX 
Therefore, 
- %r2)D:2; JL> 
Note that, 
P - P = P 
w z V 
and 
\ j j  = X'e = V'e . 
Consequently, 
ë'(Pw - Pz - Px)e = - M"^ )D~^ Î + O (1), 2n vv XX 2n p 
hence, the result. Q 
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It is easy to show that the test statistic presented in Corollary 
1.3 is equivalent to the Wald test, developed by Smith (1983), for the 
independence of the elements of X. The method of computation suggested 
here is somewhat easier to perform. Smith also shows that the Wald 
test is asymptotically equivalent to the PTu-Hausman test of independence. 
Finally, one may wish to test the hypothesis that X and Z are 
independent of e, simultaneously. This is easily done by combining 
the results of the previous two corollaries. 
Corollary 1.4 Let Model (1) and Assumptions (1) through (7) hold. 
Then, 
i.oh - Px)e) —> XK . 
where e = Y - Xg and 6 is defined by Equation (2). 
Proof ; Let 
' 
8 
r ^ • 
Z'e 
. Î. . X'e ^  
Conditioning upon X and Z, 
E(0t|j'|X,Z) = (Z' - Z'X(X'P X) X'P^ )E(ee')(X-P2X(X'P^ X) X'X) 
= <p . 
It then follows from Corollaries 1.2 and 1.3 that 
-1 d/ 0 
In 
1  ^
i °2„ J 
—> N 
$0 * 
(|) t .  
 ^ J 
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and 
where $g and are defined in Corollaries 1.2 and 1.3 respectively. 
Now, 
/N -A /V /N /S /\ 
e'(Pw - Px)e == e'Pze + e'(Pw - Pz - Px)e 
- + °p(i). 
hence, the result. Q 
The test statistics described in the previous three corollaries 
are easily computed be regressing the instrumental variable residuals 
on X and Z, on Z, and on X and recovering the residual sura of squares 
2 2 (RSS , RSS , RSS ). Let S be a consistent estimate of a . The test 
xz' z' X 
statistics may then be computed as (S^ ) ^ SS^  for Corollary 1.2, as 
(S^ )~^ (RSS - RSS - RSS ) for Corollary 1.3, and as (S^ )~^ (RSS^  ^- RSS ) XZ z X xz X 
for Corollary 1.4. 
These test statistics were developed under the assumption that X 
and Z had no columns in common, an assumption which will frequently 
be violated. Further, one may wish to test the independence between a 
subset of the elements in X and the vector e. To account for these 
possibilities, write the Model (1) as 
y = x*e + e , 
* 
where X is partitioned as 
X* = (X^  Xg X3) 
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with X^ , Xg, X^  having dimensions nxg^ , nxgg, nxg^ , (g^  +82+83 = G), 
respectively. Let the Z be partitioned as 
• Z = (X^  Z^ ) , 
where Z^  has dimensions nxk^ , (g^  + = K). 
The test statistic of Corollary 1.2 is not affected by these 
considerations. Suppose that one wishes to test the hypothesis that 
Xg is independent of the vector e, permitting X^  to be dependent upon e. 
Define 
H - (Xj X; Zj) 
and 
X = (X^  X (Xg Z)((X2 Z)'(X2 Z))"^ (X2 Zj'Xg) . 
Using the same methods as before, it can be shown that the test statistics 
of Corollaries 1.3 and 1.4 are distributed as chi-square random variables 
with g2 and k^ -g^  degrees of freedom, respectively, under the appropriate 
null hypotheses. 
For the case when the error is a sequence of independent 
identically distributed random variables, the asymptotic distribution 
of 3 was derived and several tests of exogeneity were presented in 
Corollaries 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4. Now, consider estimators of Model (1) 
when the error u^  takes the form of a stationary invertibla auto-
regressive moving average time series of order (p,q). When the error 
takes this form, the estimator given in Equation (2) will generally 
be inefficient. In addition, the estimate of the variance-covariance 
matrix of 3 computed by standard computer packages may be badly biased. 
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Let V be the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of errors u, 
V = E(uu'), 
where u = If the elements of the matrix X are fixed, 
independent of u, then it is well known that the best linear unbiased 
estimate of 3 is given by 
6 = (X'T'TX)~^ X'T'y 
where T is a nxn matrix such that 
TVT' = la^  . 
e 
when X is not independent of u, it is natural to consider the 
instrumental variable estimator 
= (X'T'Z(Z'Z)~^ Z'TX)~^ X'T'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'Ty, (3) G 
where Z is a matrix of instruments. 
The matrix T is usually specified to be lower triangular and 
constructed by the method of Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization. Define 
Yd) ... Y(1-2)" 
Y(0) ... Y(i-3) 
Y(i-3) ... Y(0) 
%i 
and 
'Y(O) 
Yd) 
"Y(i) 
Y(2) 
Y(i-l) 
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for i = 1,2,...,n, and 
2 yCO) ~ (^i) ' i~2,3, ...,n. 
= YCO) , i = 1 
• th Let the vector contain the first (i-1) elements of the i row 
of T, 
'^ -î 7 » •••> 1-1^  ' (i) ' il' x2
Then, the element of 
1^0 
T = 
""^ 21 2^0 
0 
0 
T T T 32 31 30 
0 
0 
0 
T , T „ T - ... T 
nn-1 nn-2 nn-3 no 
are given by 
T(i) = - , i = 2,3 n (4) 
and 
, i - 2,3,..., n . 
The following three lemmas are useful in deriving the properties of 
the estimator given in Equation (3). The first states that certain 
exponential functions of time dominate polynomial functions of time. 
lemma 1.1 Let Xg > > 0 and let r be a positive integer. Then, there 
exists a real number M, 0 < M < "», such that 
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for all t > 0 
Proof ; By assumption 
By repeated application of L'hopitals rule, 
lim —-—— = 0° . 
t-x» t^  
Therefore, there exists a number to such that 
t A, 
> t for all t > t , 
o 
and 
> t^  , for all t > t^  . 
Let M = (t^ )^ . Then, 
MAg > t^  A^ , for all t > 0 . 
Lemma 1.2 expresses bounds on coefficients in the infinite auto­
regressive representation of a stationary invertible autoregressive 
moving average time series. This lemma is well-known and stated without 
proof, see Fuller (1976, pp. 57, 70). 
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Lemma 1.2 Let the stationary time series satisfy the conditions 
of Assumption (5), where the roots of 
+ ... + b =0 
1 q 
are given by m^ , m^ , ..., m . Then, has the representation 
with Cq = 1, |Cg| < M M a positive constant, and 
X > max{|m^ |, ...» Im^ ]} . 
Lemma 1.3 is based upon work by Berk (1974), and relate the auto-
regressive coefficients, c^ , to the elements of T. 
Lemma 1.3 Let satisfy the conditions of Assumption (5) and let 
Cg, s = 0,l,...,i-l and i = 1,2,...,n, be defined as in Lemma 1.2. 
Define T^ s as in Equations (4). Then, 
l<=s - TisI 
where M and X are positive constant with X < 1. 
2 Proof: Without loss of generality, assume 0=1. Define 
C(i) " (^ 1/ ^ 2 '  Ci_i) • 
Let X^  be a positive constant such that 
1 > X^  > Max(|m^ |, [mgl, ..., |m^ |) , 
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where the 1 = 1 , 2 , . . . , q  ,  are defined in Lemma 1.2. 
First, consider the differences between the lower diagonal elements 
of T and the autoregressive coefficients c^ , c^ , ... . Now, 
(^i) " ^(i) " ^i (^ i C(i) f(i)) T(i)(l - . 
The first term on the right hand side of this expression may be written 
as 
Yd) + c^ y(O) + CgYfl) + ... c^ _^ Y(i-2) 
R -1 
Y(2) + c^ Y(l) + CgYCO)  ^... c^ _^ Y(i-3) 
Y(i-l) + c^  (i-2) + CgYCi-S) + ... c^ _^ Y(0) 
Noting that 
E c,Y(i-k) =0, i = 1,2,... , 
k=0 
we have 
i-1 _n 
c - T s = Z R (s,j) 
j=l 
i-1 
% c Y(j-k) 
k=0 
+ T.s (1 - aT^ ) 1 1 
i-1 _T 
= E R. (s,j) 
j=l 
Z c Y(j-k) 
k=i 
+ T.s (1 - aT^ ) . 1 1 
Need to show that the absolute value of both terms on the right 
hand side in this expression are bounded by a positive constant time 
A^ , where 0 < X < 1. Consider the first term. The absolute value of 
is bounded for all i, and 
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S c.y(j-k) 
i=l  ^
< Y(0) AJ (1 -
By Lemma 1.1 there exists a positive constant such that 
i-1 T 
- Z R/(s,j) 
j=l 
% c Y(j-k) 
k=i 
< , 
where < A < 1. 
Now, consider bounds on the term 
TiS (1 - = T^ s 0^  ^(0-1) . 
Write 
°i " 1 - J, - f(i) '(1) 
k—1 
,-i> 
= 1 - r(.) [R. (R. c. + r(.))] - c^ Y(k) . 
Therefore, by arguments similar to those already presented, there 
exists a constant such that 
where A^  < A < 1. Because T^ s and are bounded, > 1, and 
2 (a^  - 1) = (o^ -l)(a^ +1) , there exists a positive constant such 
that 
|T^ S(1 - a~b| <M2 A^  , 
where A^  < A < 1 , hence the result. f] 
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Theorem 2 Let Model (1) and Assumption (8), (9) and (1) through (5) 
hold. Then, 
- B) -
where 
e — (e^ , ^ 2, • • • > , 
* Pg is defined by Equation (3), and is the KxG matrix with the 
(i,j)th element given by 
00 
h!o 'ijh "h ' 
Proof : Now, 
* D2^ X'I'Z)D-J(D-;(Z'Z)D-J)-\^ (Z'>.) 
we first show that 
"In "'»°2n - C + 
The (i,j)th element of D^ (^Z'TX)D2^  is 
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n t-1 
t=l s=0 /ts 
I^ni^ Znj 
n-1 n-s 
Z c E Z 
s=0 t=l ti ^ t-s j 
l^ni^ 2nj 
n 
I  W 
t=l 
l^ni^ 2nj 
n 
f 
= Z c g.. + o (1) +  ^^  
s=0 P' ''ini'znj ' 
where 
t-"l 
^ t i  J q  \ - s  j ^ ^ t s  ~  
We will show that 
n 
Z W. 
 ^^  = 0_((d, ,d_ .)"^ ) . 
'^ lni'^ 2nj P 
Now, 
E(w^ ) < (Z^ i)t V KxJ )(r^  ^- Cg)2 
s=0 
< (M^  t^ )(t)(t(t^ max[(r^ g-Cg)^ ]) = M^ t^ '^^ m^ax[ (F^ -^c^ )^ ]. 
s 
By Lemma 1.1 and Lemma 1.2 there exists a constant and a constant A 
such that max(|m^ I,|m2I,..., Im I) < X < 1 and E(W^ ) Then, 
n „ n n 
E( Z W ) = Z Z E(W W ) 
t=l t=l s=l 
< M. Z Z  
t=l s=l 
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< Jk 
(l-A)' • 
and consequently, 
n 
t=l 
Therefore, 
Z = Op(l) 
n 
z 
 ^^  = CI ((d,_,d,_,)-l) 
and 
dlnld2ni P 
D-;(z'ix)D-;; - <x + %<•» 
We now show that 
the ith element of D^ (^Z'Tu) is given by 
1 3o _ Jx , I 2o 
I^ni I^ni I^ni 
n CO 
tfl ''i sft 
By arguments similar to the preceding, the last two terms in the above 
expression are Now, 
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hence, the result. 
Using the same arguments as Corollary 1.1, it is straightforward 
to show that - 3) has an asymptotic normal distribution with zero 
mean and variance-covariance matrix (M M Hi ) a". Similarly, the 
xz zz zx •' 
tests exogeneity described in Corollaries 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 remain 
asymptotically valid. 
When the error u^  contains a moving average component, construction 
of the matrix T can become very cumbersome. Fuller (1976) suggests an 
approximation that is more tractable. Let T denote the approximation 
to T, where the ith row of T is given by 
*"1—2' 2^ *"0 ^  * (7) 
The elements of T are taken directly from the infinite auto-
regressive representations of u^ .. 
Define the approximate generalized instrumental variable estimator 
as 
= (X'T'Z(Z'Z)~^ Z'TX)~^ X'T'Z(Z(Z'Z)~^ Z'Ty. 
It is clear from the proof of Theorem 2 that the limiting distribution 
of - 3) is the same as the limiting distribution of (3g - 3). 
As an example of how the data may be transfered to implement this 
estimator, suppose that u^  is an autoregressive moving average process 
of order (1,1) so that 
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I r 
To transform the variable Y^ , one would first construct as. 
= , t = 1 
11 
Y^  
Y_ + a,Y  ^ 2,3,.«.,n 
t = 1 
* 
and then construct Y as. 
= Y" 
1 ' 
* 
' ' * 
= Y^  - , t = 2,3,...,n 
A 
The variable Y^  would then be used in a standard instrumental variable 
estimator. 
In practice, the parameters (a^ , a^ , a^ ; b^ , b^ , ..., b^ ) of 
the autoregressive moving average process will be estimated from the 
vector of residuals 
u = y - X3 ,  
where 6 is given in Equation (2). If the estimates of those parameters 
are based upon a continuous function of a fixed number of au toe ovar ianc es, 
then they will have an error that is of the same order as the estimated 
au t oc ovar ianc e s. 
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In the following corollary, the behavior of estimators of the auto-
covariances of the error are described. In Theorem 6.2,1, Fuller 
(p. 237, 1976) shows that 
YYCH) - YY(H) = OP(N~^) 
where 
n-h 
— 
The estimator y^ (h) is an estimate of y^ Ch) base on the true realization 
of U^ . 
Corollary 1.5 Let Model (1) and Assumptions (l)-(5) hold. Then, 
YJ^ (h) - Y^ (h) = Op(n~^ ) , 
where y (h) is defined above, and 
u 
1 ^ ^ ^ A 
•Y^ (h) = - Z , h = 0,1,2,...,n-l , 
t=l 
where 
"t = ft - XtB , 
with 6 given in Equation (2). 
Proof ; Given 
t^ = u t ~ ^ t^  ^~ ^  
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then 
n-h . n-h n-h 
Jl "("c+h "^ t+h 
n-h n-h 
Wh (B - 6) + (8 - »• x;x^ ^^ (B 
n-h 
Consider the ith element in the vector Z X'u ,, 
t=l  ^C+h 
n-h 
t=l 
n-h „ 1 / 2  (  
< 
.A =="1 
n-h 
E u 
t=l t+h 
1/2 
SO that 
t + h  -  ° p •  t=l 
Similarly, 
<S - M'Dz.o;! V (6 - S) - 0 (1) 
t=l 
Consequently, 
n-h 
n 
n-h 
. V-". 
The following corollary describes the behavior of estimated 
approximate generalized instrumental variables estimators. 
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Corollary 1.5 Let Model (1) hold with Assumptions (8), (9), and (1) 
through (5). Let (a^ , âg, a^ ; 8^ , b^ , b^ ) be estimates of the 
y 2 
autoregressive moving average parameters with errors that are 0^ (n" ). 
Assume that the estimates (b^ , b^ , b^ ) are restricted so that the 
roots of 
+ b,M^ ~^  + ... + b =0 
are less than one in absolute value. Define as in Lemma 1.2, with 
a^  replacing a^  and b^  replacing b^ . Define T as T with c^  replacing 
c^ . Then, 
where 
- 6AG' - • 
E^AG " (X'T'Z(Z'Z)~^ Z'TX)"^ X'T'Z(Z'Z)"^ Z'Ty . (8) 
Proof ; The (i,j)th element of D^ (^Z'TX)D2^  is given by 
n t-1 n-1 n 
Z Z^ . E X. .c E c Z Z, . 
t=i s=o " s=o " t=s+i ] 
l^ni^ 2nj l^ni^ 2nj 
+ 
n-1 A n 
Jo .L : 
l^ni'^ 2nj 
n-1 n 
E c_ I Z. . X 
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This is true because there exists a positive constants and a 
A, 0 < A < 1, such that 
|cj < 
and 
so that 
and 
l^ni^ 2nj 
< . 
Consequently, 
D-;;(Z'ÏX)D-;; • °In<2'ïx)D;J + Op(.-l/2) 
Similarly, 
-1 -1 , -1/2 D/Z'TU = D/Z'TU + 0 (n ' ) , 
In In p 
hence, the result. 
Several points concerning the approximation of T suggested in (7) 
warrant discussion. Recall the inequality which bounds the squared 
differences of the elements of T and the elements of T: 
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 ^^  2 2t 
Z (Tts - Cg) < M , 
s=0 ® 
where X bounds the largest root of the characteristic equation of the 
moving average component of the error term. As this root becomes 
closer to 1 in absolute value, or the moving average component becomes 
more nearly non-invertible, the worse the approximation. The above 
inequality also makes it clear that the approximation is much worse 
for the beginning observations than for those that come later. Con­
sequently, in practice it may be desirable to actually replace the 
first few rows of T with those of T. 
Finally, it may be noted that the matrix of instruments Z could 
also be transformed by the matrix T. All of the results presented 
may be extended to this situation. The transformation of X alone has 
been considered here because that is the estimation strategy required 
for models containing rational expectations, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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10. APPENDIX C 
In the estimation of the broiler demand and supply equations, 
the quantity of broilers demanded and supplied was divided by the exact 
number of working days in the month to arrive at average slaughter per 
working day. Working days were defined to be the number of days in 
the month minus the number of Saturdays and Sundays. This is a rather 
unusual transformation and merits further discussion. 
Many econometric models deal with relationships between prices 
and quantities of commodities over some fixed sample period. The 
sample period is divided into uniform lengths of time (weeks, months, 
quarters or years) which form the basis of individual observations. 
Over each interval, prices and quantities, either supplied or 
demanded, are measured. An implicit assumption in such analyses is 
that the length of the interval of measurement is fixed. If, in fact, 
the length of the interval is subject to variation, then this may 
effect the measured values of the different variables. 
Because prices are generally reported as some kind of weighted 
average of prices within the interval, variations in the length of the 
measurement interval are not directly reflected in variations in the 
measured value. However, quantities are usually reported as totals 
for the interval, so that variations in the length of the interval 
will be reflected in variations in the quantity reported. Longer 
intervals will tend to generate larger reported quantities. If the 
length of the measurement interval is not fixed, quantity measures 
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will contain variation that cannot be attributed to variations in 
prices or to random disturbances. Quantities will be measured with 
error. 
Monthly intervals form a common basis for the measurement of 
economic data, and may be subject to this type of error. Variations 
in the length of the interval stems from two sources. The first is 
that there may be between 28 and 31 days in a month. However, many 
models estimated on the basis of monthly data include seasonal dummy 
variables. These may expected to capture much of the effect of 
variation introduced by months that differ in length. A second, and 
more important, source of interval variation is a result of the fact 
that the typical work week is composed of five days of work, with 
Saturday and Sunday designated as days of rest. Because the number of 
Saturdays and Sundays varies from month to month, the number of 
working days also varies. Further, the number of working days in a 
given month changes from year to year so that monthly dummy variables 
will not capture this variation. It is possible that a measure of 
production in one month is, say, greater, than in another month simply 
because there were more working days, and not because of any economic 
factor. 
While it seems plausible that the arrangement of the calendar 
will influence measures of quantity, when those measures are made on a 
monthly basis, the question of interest is whether the resulting error 
is large enough to effect econometric analyses. The number of working 
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days in a month ranges between 20 and 23. Over the sample period 
1968-1981, 20 months had 20 working days, 46 months had 21, 58 months 
had 22, and 44 months had 23. The average percentage change in 
working days from month to month over this period was 6.7%. It was 
found that, in fact, the variation in the measures of broiler 
slaughter due to the composition of the calendar was enough to sub­
stantially change the outcomes of the econometric analyses. The 
exact nature of the effects depended upon whether broiler slaughter 
was used as an independent or a dependent variable in a particular 
analysis. 
When broiler quantity is an independent variable in an analysis, 
errors in measurement will cause the estimates of the coefficients in 
the model to be biased. As is discussed in Section 3 of Chapter 4, 
the quantity of broilers is to be regarded an independent variable in 
the estimation of the broiler demand equation. For the moment ignoring 
other factors, the demand equation for broilers may be written in 
logarithmic form as: 
Log(PBRj.) = Bq + B^ Log(QBED^ /WRKDY^ ) + 
where the measure of broiler quantity, QBRD(t), is not standardized by 
the number of working days in the month. This equation may be written: 
Log(PBRj.) = Bq + B^ Log(QBRD^ ) + B^ LogCWRKDY^ ) + 
169 
where = -Bg- A test of the null hypothesis that the measure of 
broiler quantity should be normalized by the number of working days 
may be performed by estimating the parameters of this model and 
testing the hypothesis that B^  = -Bg. 
In Section 3 of Chapter 4, the full specification of the broiler 
demand equation is discussed. This equation was estimated by ordinary 
least squares with broiler price as the dependent variable and with 
separate variables measuring the quantity of broilers demanded and the 
number of working days. The data were transformed to account for first 
order serial correlation in the errors (the estimated first order 
autocorrelation was 0.65). The coefficient on the number of working 
days (0.82) was close to being the negative of the coefficient on 
broiler quantity (-0.88). A test of that hypothesis gave an 
t-statistic of 1.14, with 149 degrees of freedom. Consequently, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the measure of broiler quantity 
should be normalized by the number of working days. 
Failing to account for the number of working days seemed to sub­
stantially bias the estimates of the coefficients in this model. In 
particular, the estimated own price elasticity of demand changed from 
-1.13 to -4.61 when the number of working days was excluded from the 
model. 
The demand equation was also estimated using instrumental 
variables with broiler quantity, uncorrected for the number of working 
days, as the dependent variable and with WRKDY included as an 
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independent variable. The instruments used were: 
{C,S2-S12,T,T2,INC^ ,PBF^ ,PPK^ ,PTK^ .,CHK^ _2,WRKDY^ } 
The estimated first order autocorrelation was 0.63. One would expect 
the coefficient on WRKDY to equal 1.0. The estimated coefficient was 
0.94. A test that the coefficient was equal to 1.0 gave a t-statistic 
of 1.32, so that the hypothesis that the measure of broiler quantity 
should be normalized by the number of working days could not be re­
jected. 
Because the error in measurement is due to the composition of 
the calendar, it is not random, and introduces a nonstationary component 
to the residuals of such an equation. Not correcting for the number 
of working days introduced substantial distortions in the autocorrela­
tions computed from the residuals of the estimated equation. It is 
particularly interesting that the calendar effect introduced a strong 
negative bias in the computed first order autocorrelation. Tests of 
serial correlation based upon the first order autocorrection (in 
particular, the Durbin-Watson statistic) were then also badly biased. 
To illustrate this, the demand equation was estimated by instru­
mental variables with broiler quantity as the dependent variable with 
no correction for the number of working days. The first 36 estimated 
autocorrelations of the residuals from this regression are displayed 
in Figure 12. While the first order autocorrelation is small (0.07), 
it is clear that the residuals do not form a stationary time series. 
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Figure 12. Autocorrelations of residuals from demand equation 
with broiler quantity uncorrected for the number of 
working days 
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Further, if one examines them closely, a regular pattern in their 
behavior can be detected. After correcting for the number of working 
days in the month, the behavior of the autocorrelations of the 
residuals was more in line with what one would expect from an 
economic model, and the estimated first order autocorrelation in­
creased to 0.63. 
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11. APPENDIX D. DATA DEFINITION AND SOURCES 
This appendix contains a description of the data used in the 
empirical analysis and a statement of their source. Several comments 
are appropriate. All the data are measured on a monthly basis. All 
the monetary variables are deflated by the wholesale price index, 
except for per-capita income which is deflated by the implicit GNP 
price deflator for consumption expenditures. All the nondeterministic 
variables are in logarithmic form. 
The following variables were constructed from data obtained from 
the Poultry and Egg Situation, 1966-1981): 
QBR: 
QBRD: 
PER: 
PBRLAG: 
CHK: 
PLA: 
FLK; 
PTK: 
inspected broiler slaughter, ready-to-cook weight 
(divided by the number of working days in the month, 
millions of pounds per day). 
inspected broiler slaughter, ready-to-cook weight, 
plus changes in frozen chicken inventories (divided 
by the number of working days in the month, millions 
of pounds per day). 
9-city weighted average wholesale broiler price 
(cents per pound). 
seven month moving average of PER, centered 3 months 
earlier. 
number of broiler chicks hatched (millions of birds) 
number of chicks placed in hatchery supply flocks 
(millions of birds) 
hatchery flock size, constructed as the sum of PLA 6 
to 13 months earlier (millions of birds). 
wholesale turkey price at New York, 8-16 pound hens, 
ready-to-cook weight (cents per pound). 
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The following variables were constructed from data obtained from 
the Survey of Current Business, (1968-1981): 
QBF: inspected beef slaughter plus changes in frozen 
beef inventories (millions of pounds) 
QPK: inspected pork slaughter plus changes in frozen 
pork inventories (millions of pounds). 
QTK: inspected turkey slaughter plus changes in frozen 
turkey inventories (millions of pounds). 
PBF: wholesale price of fresh choice beef carcasses 
(cents per pound). 
PPK: wholesale price of fresh 8-14 pound pork loins at 
New York (centers per pound). 
INC: disposable income per capita (dollars per person) 
WPI: wholesale price index (1967=100). 
DEF: implicit GNP price deflator for consumption expendi-' 
turns (1967=100). 
The following variables were constructed from data obtained from the 
Chicago Board of Trade Annual Report (1966-1982) 
PCN: price of Chicago No. 2 yellow corn (dollars per bushel) 
PEN: price of Decatur 44% soybean meal (dollars per ton). 
PFD: price of broiler feed, constructed as 
PFD = ((0.7&PCN/56) + (0.3*PBN/2000)) (dollars per pound). 
PFDLAG: seven month moving average of PFD, centered 5 months 
earlier. 
The following variables were constructed as described: 
T: time trend, takes on the value 1 in January 1968, 
and value 168 on December 1981. 
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time squared 
seasonal dummy variable taking on the value 1 in the i'th 
month and the value 0 elsewhere (i=l for January, i=12 for 
December) . 
number of working days in the month, constructed as the 
number of days in the month minus the number of Sundays 
and Saturdays. 
